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POLL ON PERSHING, NATO, DISARMAMENT ATTITUDES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Sep 83 p 11

[Article by Prof Dr Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Allensbach: "Three Fourths Against Stationing of Missiles?--The Reality Seems More Complex"]

[Text] "If one can consider the latest opinion polls to be halfway believable..." wrote Heinrich Boell. What he had in mind was a poll by the ZDF [Second German Television Program] for the Polit-Barometer program. At last the situation was quite clear for a change. According to this poll, three fourths of the population were against the stationing of missiles in the territory of the FRG if the negotiations in Geneva fail. Whatever the German government would do in the autumn, at least it had to know now that if it kept to the stationing plan it would have against it an overwhelming majority of the population. In one fell swoop, the television poll made all debates on the attitude of the German population superfluous.

In the spring of 1983, at a working conference of political scientists in America on the question of the arms buildup, I had described how using different formulations on this subject leads to completely contradictory results. Majorities for the NATO two-track decision, majorities against it. The situation was too tempting to not become exploited in the political dispute. The reporter can practically choose for himself which picture of the attitude of the population he wants to give.

In the Polit-Barometer program of the ZDF (program of 4 July), the commentator selected two questions. The first went: "In Geneva the Soviet Union and the United States are presently conducting disarmament negotiations on intermediate-range missiles. If these negotiations do not lead to any agreement by the autumn, what should happen then?" Three possibilities were offered to the interviewees for their selection. Some 72 percent of those questioned picked the first option: "Continue to negotiate on disarmament and do not deploy any new missiles in the FRG." Some 22 percent thought: "Continue to negotiate on disarmament, but at the same time station new missiles in the FRG." Finally, 2 percent voted for: "Break off the disarmament negotiations and deploy new missiles in the FRG." The second question designed to characterize the mood of the public went: "Let us assume that new missiles would be stationed here in this neighborhood. Would you be agreeable to that, or would you disapprove of this?" "Approve," said 21 percent, "disapprove," said 79 percent.

The commentator explained: "These figures make it clear that there is a gap here between the official German security policy and the majority opinion of the population....Also...it is noteworthy that the arms buildup in the form now being discussed is rejected by a majority of the voters of both the CDU/CSU and the FDP." Any statement in such a sweeping form is certainly not accurate. Four poll results from the Allensbach polls in August 1983 contradict this.

Since May 1981, since the Hamburg Church Conference with which the peace movement was initiated against the NATO arms buildup, the question has been asked by Allensbach: "For some time now we have had the so-called NATO two-track decision. In this, the NATO countries have agreed on the one hand to themselves station corresponding missiles in Central Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet intermediate-range missiles, and on the other hand to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of arms. Do you think that this two-track decision is on the whole good or not good?" Whenever this question was asked, about half of the people answered "good." Between 20 and 25 percent said "not good" (Table 1).

Table 1. Two-track Decision

Question: "For some time now we have had the so-called NATO two-track decision. In this, the NATO countries have agreed on the one hand to themselves station corresponding missiles in Central Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet intermediate-range missiles, and on the other hand to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of arms. Do you think that this two-track decision is on the whole good or not good?"

	(4) Mai 1981	(5) Januar 1982	Dezember 1982	August 1983
	(8) in Prozent		(6)	(7)
Finde ich gut (1)	53	52	51	49
Finde ich nicht gut (2)	20	22	25	23
Unentschieden (3)	27	26	24	28
	100	100	100	100

Key: 1. I think it is good 6. December 1982
 2. I do not think it is good 7. August 1983
 3. Undecided 8. In percent
 4. May 1981 Source: Allensbach Archives
 5. January 1982

A public dispute developed over this question. It was maintained that one could not present the two-track decision in a single question: If two concepts of action were combined in one question, a person would not know which aspect the population agrees with and which aspect perhaps is being rejected.

But the NATO arms buildup decision is really a "package." One must either accept both possibilities of action together, or if one does not want to accept one of them, he should reject both. I do not believe that it is

asking too much of the people--on something so important as the two-track decision, which forms a "package"--to request them to express approval or rejection. But the basic rule of conducting opinion polls--when there are difficult circumstances, to study the attitudes with a larger number of questions--certainly applies here.

A second question was very close to the ZDF question in its content, but was much more simply formulated in its answer prescriptions. It went: "A question on the Geneva disarmament negotiations. If by the end of the Geneva negotiations in October there is no outcome and the Soviet Union lets stand its SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe: Should then the new American intermediate-range Pershing II missiles be deployed in the FRG, as the NATO two-track decision provides, or should they not be deployed?" Here there is no longer any 72-percent majority seen against the deployment of the new missiles in case the Geneva negotiations fail. Some 40 percent said in August 1983: "Should not be deployed," and 37 percent said "should be deployed," while 23 percent remained undecided.

Another Allensbach question sounds out the interviewees somewhat like the ZDF question about whether they would approve if new missiles were to be stationed in their own neighborhoods, only in the opposite direction; but it is just as realistic as the possibility that new missiles will be deployed at their own places of residence. The question goes: "Assuming that we have only the choice of withdrawing from NATO or deploying the new American missiles among us. What should we then do: Withdraw or deploy the new missiles?" A majority of 46 percent answers "deploy the new missiles," while 22 percent say "withdraw from NATO." The 72-percent majority which had said "do not deploy missiles" has shrunk to 22 percent. Even the SPD supporters are split, with 34 percent saying "deploy new missiles" and 30 percent saying "get out of NATO." The Greens are not split, with 73 percent voting for "withdraw from NATO" (Table 2).

Table 2. NATO Withdrawal?

Question: "Assuming we have only the choice of withdrawing from NATO or deploying the new American missiles among us. What should we then do: Withdraw from NATO or deploy the new missiles?"

(August 1983)	(1) Bevölkerung insgesamt	CDU/CSU-Wähler	SPD-Wähler	FDP-Wähler	Wähler der GRÜNEN
	(2) in Prozent	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Die neuen Raketen aufstellen (7)	46	84	34	80	11
Aus der Nato austreten (8)	22	9	30	13	73
Weiß nicht (9)	32	27	36	27	16
	100	100	100	100	100

- Key:
- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Total population | 6. Voters for the Greens |
| 2. In percent | 7. Deploy the new missiles |
| 3. CDU/CSU voters | 8. Withdraw from NATO |
| 4. SPD voters | 9. Do not know |
| 5. FDP voters | |

This question bothers women the most deeply. Here some 54 percent of the men but only 38 percent of the women settled on the answer: "Deploy new missiles."

Finally, two questions were directed at the crux of the arms buildup decision--namely, the establishment of equilibrium. The first question on this went: "Have we really a balance at present between the intermediate-range missiles of the East and the intermediate-range missiles of NATO, or no balance?" "We have a balance" responded 13 percent, "no balance" said 50 percent, while 37 percent remained undecided. Follow-up question: "Do you think a balance between the intermediate-range missiles of the East and NATO is necessary, or not absolutely necessary?" "Is necessary," said 59 percent, and "not absolutely necessary," said 24 percent. Although the Greens are very united among themselves, with 20 percent saying "necessary" and 60 percent saying "not absolutely necessary," they are far removed from SPD supporters, 53 percent of whom answered that "a balance is necessary," while 31 percent said "not necessary." But also 51 percent of the Greens are in favor of a withdrawal from NATO, whereas only 12 percent of the SPD supporters desire this.

These results really should not be so very puzzling, even though they are contradictory and disappoint those who desire a clear statement: "The people do not want any stationing of missiles" or "the people want the protection of NATO. They want equilibrium and thus also a stationing, if the negotiations in Geneva fail...." Finally, the conflict between opposing desires and goals is as much a part of everyday experience in the political as in the personal sphere. Why should it become resolved in opinion polls? In the case of subjects laden with conflict, one can only draw conclusions from a suitable handling of the results from opinion polls, ask questions from various points of view, and never base reports only on one or two questions from a single viewpoint.

For 2 1/2 years now, the people have been exposed to a quite considerable propaganda pressure, as can be inferred from the results of the polls. For example, there is the question of the unilateral disarmament of the West. Between July 1981 and August 1983, in seven Allensbach polls a dialogue was presented with the following wording: "In my opinion, there can be progress in disarmament only if one side just starts the ball rolling. This would be a sign of trust which the other side cannot disregard. That would really lead to peace and detente." The opposite position goes: "I see the matter differently. A state which unilaterally disarms puts itself at the mercy of potential aggressors. It can be blackmailed, and thereby it will contribute more to insecurity than to peace between East and West." In July 1981 the majority, 47 percent, decided against unilateral disarmament, while 33 percent spoke in favor of it. But little by little this majority was worn away, and in August 1983 instead of 47 percent only 37 percent came out against unilateral disarmament, while those in favor of it became the majority, having risen from 33 to 46 percent (Table 3).

Table 3. Unilateral Disarmament

Question: "Here two people are talking about disarmament. Once you have read this, which of the two statements is closer to that which you also believe, the top one or the bottom one?"

	(1) Juli 1981	(2) Dezember 1981	Mal 1982	November 1982	Februar 1983	Juni 1983	August 1983
	In Prozent		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
„Ich finde, bei der Abrüstung kann es nur dann einen Fortschritt geben, wenn eine Seite einmal damit anfängt. Das wäre ein Vertrauensbeweis, den die andere Seite nicht außer acht lassen kann. Das würde wirklich zu Frieden und Entspannung führen“ (8)	33	37	34	41	42	40	48
„Das sehe ich anders. Ein Staat, der einseitig abrüstet, liefert sich damit möglichen Angriffen aus. Man kann ihn erpressen, und dadurch wird er eher zur Unsicherheit beitragen als zum Frieden zwischen Ost und West“ (9)	47	42	40	44	44	38	37
Unentschieden (10)	20	21	17	15	14	22	17
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Key: 1. July 1981

2. December 1981

3. May 1982

4. November 1982

5. February 1983

6. June 1983

7. August 1983

8. "In my opinion, there can be progress in disarmament only if one side just starts the ball rolling. This would be a sign of trust which the other side cannot disregard. That would really lead to peace and detente."

9. "I see the matter differently. A state which unilaterally disarms puts itself at the mercy of potential aggressors. It can be blackmailed, and thereby it will contribute more to insecurity than to peace between East and West."

10. Undecided

In a quite similar fashion, there was a gradual but persistent change in the attitudes to the question: "For the future, should we cooperate equally closely with America and Russia, or preferably closer with Russia, or preferably closer with America? What do you think?" Since the end of 1982, the view "equally closely with America and Russia" has continually gained ground. In June 1983, 47 percent held this view compared to 42 percent which wanted a closer relationship with the alliance partner America (Table 4).

Table 4. Equidistance

Question: "A quite general question on German foreign policy: For the future, should we cooperate equally closely with America and Russia, or preferably closer with Russia, or preferably closer with America? What do you think?"

	1981	1982	1983			
			(1) Januar	(2) März	(3) April	(4) Juni
(5) in Prozent						
Lieber enger mit Amerika (6)	48	47	39	40	42	42
Mit Amerika und Rußland gleich eng (7)	38	42	51	49	48	47
Lieber enger mit Rußland (8)	1	2	1	1	1	2
Unentschieden (9)	13	9	9	10	11	9
	100	100	100	100	100	100

- Key:
1. January
 2. March
 3. April
 4. June
 5. In percent
 6. Preferably closer with America
 7. Equally closely with America and Russia
 8. Preferably closer with Russia
 9. Undecided

It is probably no accident that for some time now a concept from geology has come somewhat into fashion, the concept of "faults." In this battle for public opinion, incompatible approaches to certain questions really do thrust over one another and generate contradictory attitudes. Thus, standing incompatibly beside the view of almost half of the population that we should cooperate equally closely with America and Russia in foreign policy is the information from about 60 percent that they agree with the sentence from the governmental policy statement of Federal Chancellor Kohl in October 1982 and similarly in May 1983: "The keystone of the Alliance continues to be our deep-rooted friendship with the United States of America."

Also the confidence that the United States would stand by the FRG in an attack by the Soviet Union is unshaken. Here we have results at our disposal spanning a period of 25 years to the question: "If the Soviet Union were to try to conquer West Germany, what do you think: Would the Americans then help us, or would they not risk a war on our account?" "They would help us," said 61 percent in 1958, and 62 percent still said this in 1983. "Would not risk any war because of us," thought only 19 percent both 25 years ago and today.

Is the psychological war being taken seriously enough? On one of the SPD posters prior to the 1983 Bundestag election, a young man was seen arguing

with chancellor candidate Hans Jochen Vogel: "Sheer madness!" said the young man despairingly, "our country is crammed with weapons, and now even more missiles are to be deployed...." Is it not necessary to understand that new missiles look like madness to young people? If for no other reason, would it not be important for the psychological effect to give in to the proposal to dismantle one Pershing I for each Pershing II which is deployed? The Allensbach August poll included two questions on this:

"After all, there have been American Pershing I missiles in the territory of the FRG for a long time now. Did you know that, or are you learning this for the first time?" "I knew it," answered 67 percent. A question followed which was asked of everyone: "It has been proposed that for each Pershing II which is deployed, one of the older Pershing I's should be dismantled, so that the number of missiles does not increase. Do you think that is a good proposal or not a good proposal?" "A good proposal," answered 46 percent, and "not a good proposal" said 27 percent. Those who did not think this a good proposal were further asked: "And why not: because then security would suffer, or because you do not want to see any Pershing II missiles?" Only 18 percent of the population said it was not a good proposal because they did not want any Pershing II's at all in FRG territory. Even among young people under 30 years old, only 24 percent said that. The substituting of Pershing II's for Pershing I's would also make it clear to circles of the public which are uninterested in military engineering that it is a question of modernization and not of a further "cramming" of the country with weapons.

However, the anxiety cannot be dispelled solely by the realization that it is no longer a matter of weapons, but simply one of modernization. The core of the opposition to the arms buildup lies in the feeling of a large portion of the population that weapons do not signify protection, but a threat. Of course, nobody would think that a person who carries with him a revolver in a dangerous situation is thereby threatening himself more than protecting himself. But when transferred to the abstract dimensions of military arms, things look different. Two views were compared with one another in the August Allensbach poll: "I am in favor of deploying the Pershing II missiles, because more modern weapons also mean more security." Some 31 percent agreed. The opposite view went: "More powerful weapons means more danger. Therefore I am against having the Pershing II's deployed." Some 48 percent subscribed to that.

The supporters of the government's policy, the spokesmen of the arms-buildup decision, are clearly being pressured by the climate of public opinion. One discerns this from various symptoms. The opponents of the stationing of missiles feel completely in agreement with the majority opinion, with 72 percent saying: "Most people are against it." By a majority of 50 percent, they expect a strengthening of their camp in the future. The supporters of stationing are filled with doubt, and only 42 percent believe that the majority is on their side. For the future they expect as more likely a decrease rather than an increase in their camp. Such assessments of the general mood affect the self-confidence, the certainty with which each holds his opinion, and thus the climate of opinion is either further strengthened or weakened. Today the proponents of the arms buildup are clearly less confident than they were 2 years ago--when the dispute began--about voicing their convictions in public.

Nevertheless, the conceptions of the population on the topic of stationing missiles are too mixed for the "hot autumn" to be able to develop as planned. For the necessary mood of protest to be there, the expectation that a "hot autumn" will develop would have to increase in the population. But the opposite is the case. A question asked in both July and August goes: "If the Geneva disarmament negotiations fail in the autumn and new American intermediate-range missiles are deployed: Do you expect that in such a case there will be serious disturbances, or do you think that things will go no further than demonstrations?" In July the answers were evenly divided. Some 42 percent expected that "serious disturbances will develop," while 41 percent believed that "things will go no further than demonstrations." In August the expectation "serious disturbances will develop" fell from 42 to 36 percent, and instead of 41 percent now 48 percent said: "Things will go no further than demonstrations."

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EXTREME RIGHTIST TERRORISTS MOTIVATED BY MONEY

Bonn DIE WELT in German 23 Sep 83 p 6

[Article by Werner Kahl]

[Text] Extreme rightist "People's Socialists" had planned a toy made of plastic explosives that explodes when a child's hand presses it as the most brutal terrorist weapon of 1983 after the bombing attacks against American housing areas in the Rhine/Main area last fall. This was discovered as a result of inquiries by a special commission of the Hessian state police on the six man bombing team that was discovered and arrested with the exception of one member. The Federal Prosecutor's Office will soon press charges of attempted murder in three cases in addition to bodily harm, bank robbery, and the formation of a terroristic organization with explosive materials. The sixth man of the group, the former mechanical engineering student, Odfried Hepp, is still a fugitive.

But their idol was Mammon, and not Adolf Hitler, the investigators say. Dissatisfied with their work, having left their careers or studies, and always looking for money, they slid into the criminal path. They stole 630,000 D-marks from banks. One of the participants bought himself a Japanese limousine, another paid five debts, while a third put his money in certificates of deposit. At the meetings of the extreme rightist "People's Socialists," they sought political orientation. "We do not greet each other with 'Heil Hitler,'" Hepp instructed his comrades. "Our greeting is, 'Heil Deutschland.'" Then they began last year with "leisure time terrorism," just as the extreme leftists had done since the seventies, especially in the Frankfurt area.

Promoted to Chief Thinker

The state police of the Hessian State Criminal Office in Wiesbaden and the Federal Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe now took a position on the events in response to questions from DIE WELT. Who was behind the "Brown bombing track" (DIE ZEIT)? Had the "German neonazi groups" (QUICK) taken a page from the radical leftist terrorists?

Right after the attacks, the security authorities assumed that perpetrators came from the radical left, because they are the ones who always choose American areas as targets. Then the state police found something. The 22-year-

old Dieter Sporleder, Hans-Peter Fraas, also 22, the 40-year-old Helge Karl-Wulf Blasche, Ulrich Tillmann, a journalist, and Walter Kexel, a farm hand, were arrested. Tillmann and Kexel were in Parkstone (Dorset County). The trail of the 25-year-old fugitive Odfried Hepp was lost in extreme rightist circles in Berlin.

According to the police, the bombers turned out to be a small Hessian group. No organizational contact with extraregional German or foreign extreme rightist movements could be ascertained. In headlines, Hepp, who had returned from the Near East but gone underground again, was promoted to "Chief Thinker of the German neonazis." Hepp, the "head," and Kexel, the "hand," had lived together in an apartment in the Offenbach area. They came together with the other members of the sextet through meetings of the "People's Socialist Movement" of the neonazi Friedhelm Busse, who is presently charged in Munich.

Ulrich Tillmann joined the loose organization, "Germanic Socialists" (leftist TAGESZEITUNG). Dieter Sporleder, "S.S. commander" with contacts to the HNG [Assistance Organization for National Prisoners] came from Giessen. Like Hepp, Hans-Peter Fraas had connections with the "Hoffmann Defense Sport Group." Among their acquaintances was Frank Schubert, who had contacts with Swiss extreme rightists. Schubert killed himself after a shootout at the Swiss border during which two customs agents were shot with his weapon.

Kexel is supposed to have made the suggestion to upgrade the criminal activity with politically motivated attacks and to create unrest among the Americans. At the same time, Hepp wrote a manifesto in Frankfurt against "Americanism." "We think everyone is justified in this struggle," Hepp said. "We only have a chance if rightists and leftists come together." The leftist TAGESZEITUNG (TAZ) not only published Hepp's "Invitation to Union," it also documented the declaration by Hepp and Kexel, "Farewell to Hitlerism," an attempt after 50 years to revive the so-called left socialistic wing of the Nazi Party under the brothers Gregor and Otto Strasser. Hepp and Kexel gave as their goal -- as did recently the initiator of the "Krefelder Appeal," Josef Weber -- a "neutral Germany" on the side of a "Soviet Russia." At the extradition procedure in London, Public Prosecutor Jones stressed that the Germans belonged to a group marked by hatred of the West.

Candidate of the Hessian Election

"Old comrades of Hepp and Kexel had to move a few days ago from the Hessian election campaign to investigatory arrest. Arndt-Heinz Marx, Hessian chairman of the "Action for the Deportation of Foreigners of the AAR [People's Movement Against Foreign Influence and Destruction of the Environment] is said to have, together with party comrades, mistreated a disloyal member. Marx is also considered to be at the same time the leading member of the militant neonazi organization, ANS/NA [National Socialist Action Front/National Activitists] In the Hessian election Sunday he sought an AAR seat in the state legislature. But on his continuing path to becoming "a political force to reckon with before this decade is out," he will have to forgo the assistance of the bomber sextet. The six are accused of crimes that call for sentences of up to life imprisonment.

The investigations left unclear the role of foreign organizations and of the "DDR" secret service. Does the "GDR" central airport, Berlin-Schoenefeld, only serve the fugitive Hepp as a means of avoiding Western checks, or is the state security service just arranging for collection and information centers in the Near East through cover men as in the case of the escaped neonazi Albrecht?

9124

CSO: 3620/16

POLICE OFFICER GUNNED DOWN NEAR SAN SEBASTIAN

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 17 Sep 83 p 4

[Text] National policeman Pablo Sanchez Cesar, stationed at the Aldapeta barracks of San Sebastian since 1980, died yesterday at 8:30 in the morning in the railway station of Urnieta while waiting for the train that would have taken him to work, a victim of three shots that hit him in the head and the body.

It seems that, according to versions obtained from the few witnesses found at the scene of the event, the national policeman became aware of two people that he thought were suspicious moments before being attacked. Pablo Sanchez tried to protect himself, and even tried to use his service weapon (it was not found) but he was hit by his aggressors before he was able to repel the attack.

A first examination of the corpse revealed three gunshot wounds, one of which, the one to the head, was of necessity a mortal one. According to eyewitnesses and neighbors of the Urnieta railway station, nearly 10 shots were heard though only 5 SF brand cartridges were found.

An hour and a half later, approximately, the body of Pablo Sanchez was taken and transported to the Polloe cemetery in San Sebastian, where an autopsy was performed. The national policeman was 24 years old, was married and had a 1-year-old daughter. He was from Badajoz and resided in Urnieta.

As of yesterday evening, the number of vehicles used by the authors of the crime was not known. The police sustains that the commando used a 131 Seat taxicab that was rigorously examined by police officials. The aforementioned Seat was found by the Civil Guard on the road from Urnieta to Lasarte.

Police sources said that the number of aggressors could be up to four. This commando had operated at all times with uncovered faces, two of them firing the shots (according to the police) while the other two waited in the previously mentioned [Seat] 131.

As for the vehicle used, a 131 taxicab with a SS-7843-N license plate, it would have been stolen at gunpoint at around 7 a.m.

At that time, still according to the police version, several armed persons forced its owner to get into the trunk where he stayed while the crime was being committed. Soon after that the police found the car with the owner in the trunk.

Other versions said that eyewitnesses were able to see three of the persons who committed the crime.

According to these sources, one of the members of the commando was tall, thin, dark-haired and wore a red jacket.

Another of the members was approximately 1.70 meters tall, dark-haired, moustached and wore dark gray slacks with a sweater of the same color.

The third one had a thick beard, was 1.70 m tall and wore gray pants and a navy sweater.

At 8 p.m. a funeral service was held at the Urnieta parrish and it was attended by, among other officials, the lehendakari [the president of the Basque regional government], Garaikoetxea.

In the early hours of the afternoon a chapelle ardente was installed in the hall of the seat of the Civil Government of Guipuzcoa. After the funeral, the remains of national policeman Pablo Sanchez Cesar were moved to Badajoz where he will be buried.

As soon as the news were known, statements of condemnation were issued by several political parties.

The provincial committee of the Basque Socialist Party-Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSE-PSOE) and the Popular Alliance-Democratic Popular Party-UL (AP-PDP-UL) coalition made public their respective texts of condemnation of the crime.

The PSE-PSOE "condemns without qualification this new crime and the terrorists who are nothing but simple murderers and enemies of the Basque people."

They include in their condemnation "those groups which directly or covertly support the terrorist organizations."

The AP-PDP-UL coalition insists in its communique that "ETA is determined to destroy the Basque people and plunge it into the most absolute misery and poverty."

"To this end," they add, "these gangsters of terror do not hesitate to display their disgusting contempt for life."

The president of the central government expressed his profound feeling of grief for the death by murder of national policeman Pablo Sanchez Cesar during a summit meeting of governors, government delegates to the autonomous communities and high officials of the Interior Ministry that was held yesterday in Madrid on the Citizen Security Plan.

MADRID POLICE UNCOVER GRAPO EXPLOSIVES LAB

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 17 Sep 83 p 9

[Text] The police has uncovered a clandestine apartment in Valladolid used by the GRAPO as a laboratory equipped with substantial quantities of materials for the manufacture of explosive devices, informed a notice made public yesterday by the Ministry of the Interior.

The situation in that apartment, according to the notice, was known to the police information services and it had been under surveillance for some time. When the latest arrests of members of the organization were made in La Coruna it was decided to enter the apartment.

In the building, located at 23 Tortuela street, apartment two F, the following materials for fabricating explosives were apprehended: 20 packs with 250 grams each of aluminum-silver powder, 15 envelopes with 250 grams of powdered aluminum, a jug of nitric acid at 60 percent, 3 kgs of sulfur, a vial of mercury, a homemade-type handbomb complete with detonator, a homemade percussion cap, 17 flashbulbs and 2 "Tudor 6 H-3" batteries.

Additionally, abundant supplies for handling the previously-mentioned objects have been impounded. These were for manufacturing explosives and also included public address equipment and GRAPO propaganda tracts.

Central Information Brigade officials are still interrogating Alfonso Gonzalez Cambeiro and Maria del Carmen Cayetano Navarro at the police facilities of Puerta del Sol; they were detained 12 September in La Coruna during their attempted holdup of a Banco Exterior branch.

It seems that, according to EFE, Gonzalez Cambeiro would have recognized his participation in the death of a civil guard in La Coruna and in another attempt against a national policeman in Gijon. The two would also have confessed having carried out several holdups and placed explosive devices.

In another matter, 150 people gathered, according to police sources, at 7 p.m. Thursday in the municipal square of Prat de Llobregat (Barcelona) to ask for the liberation of Ramon Font.

Ramon Font i Casas was detained at dawn last Wednesday. He was later taken to the Police High Command where he was informed that the antiterrorist law had been invoked in his case after a search of his house had yielded propaganda from the Communist Party of Spain (Reconstructed [faction]) and from GRAPO.

The detainee is a Catalan teacher at the San Cosme and San Damian School in El Prat. He taught in the adult section of the Belvitge cultural center and he had collaborated with the General Directorate for Linguistic Policy of the Generalidad in Hospitalet de Llobregat.

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PASOK GOVERNMENT SEEN LEADING ECONOMY TO FAILURE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25-26 Sep 83 pp 1,15

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou]

[Text] The government's economic staff is facing very difficult choices, since by next month at the latest it must have come to decisions about the economic policy to be followed in 1984. In a year, that is, whose course will be branded by the critical Eurodeputies elections, while the workers' economic situation will be burdened instead of improved. The narrow street of 1982 has been succeeded now by the tunnel of 1983, whose length, with the repeated delays in the recovery, is increasing to a point that one can no longer see the light at the end....

According to our information, the first conclusions from the successive KYSYM [Government Council] conferences about formation of the 1984 economic policy are discouraging. The facts of the economy indicate that the restrictive income policy of meager pay increases will be continued in 1984 and inflation will remain a first-priority problem, while the slackness of production and investments will fix the economy at the present low levels.

It is clear that such unfavorable prospects weaken the arguments of those ministers (mainly Mr. Arsenis) who are suggesting to Mr. Papandreou an acceleration of recourse to parliamentary elections at the same time or earlier than the June 1984 Euroelections.

Thus, the real impossibility of backing even temporarily a policy of demagogic grantings, at least to the economically weaker classes, in combination with the president's very significant warning that at the moment the country has no need of elections, but of calmness, prudent management and hard work, are forming a new situation. Without excluding it, it is quite a bit more difficult now for the government to flee from reality by resorting to early elections, which would offer it the possibility of putting off for several months taking measures to stabilize the economy, the political cost of which remains high, as has been shown this year (delays in automatic cost of living readjustment and devaluation of the drachma).

As emerges from the data placed under view of KYSYM, the economic ministers' discouraging conclusion about the stagnancy continuing in 1984 is based on the realization that in the last two years the government policy has caused such changes in the economy that there are now insuperable impediments to recovery.

Nationalization of the Economy

These changes are constituted in the gradual nationalization of the economy, the progressive strangling of private initiative, and the country's great dependence on foreign lending. More specifically:

1. The public sector of the economy, which contributes more than 50 percent to formation of the country's national income, which Andreas G. Papandreou himself found already inordinately high in 1981 when he took power, is becoming more gigantic every day as a result of a conscious policy of strangling and shrinking the private sector. PASOK's pre-electoral program of socializations--which many had disparaged, considering it demagogic empty talk--is being realized, gratuitously, in fact.

Those who maintained that PASOK would not proceed in this sector, because it would be unable to find the 200 or 300 billion drachmas needed to buy out the businesses, were refuted. Instead of copying the French Government which paid exorbitant compensations to the five industries it nationalized, it devised the more "ingenious" method of taking them free of charge, after it has made them problematic with its policy or has bankrupted them.

In production, exports, domestic commerce, transportation, etc., the role and strength of the state, of public enterprises or so-called new agencies (associations, popular-base companies, local self-administration, etc.) is being expanded daily.

Side-Effects

This process of supposedly socialist transformation (because in essence it has nothing to do with social change, it is about the seizure and plunder of branches of the economy by party nomenclature) has two basic side-effects, however, which are not a Greek phenomenon only. First, it downgrades our economy's productivity and competitiveness since the state's invasion into enterprises leads to irresponsibility, lack of initiative and slackening of business; second, it swells the public deficits and thus constantly revivifies inflation.

If this imprudent policy is continued, Greece will soon become a country of public employees struggling for their share of a production and income which are constantly shrinking.

The gradual nationalization of the economy is being acknowledged officially. In the Ministry of Economy's last quarterly report, in which is expressed the overly optimistic opinion that the national income will increase this year by 0.4 percent (whereas it is more probable it will decrease by one percent), the melancholy realization is added that: "It must be noted, however, that achievement of this small rate of increase in the gross national product (AEP) is due exclusively and solely to the intense activity of the economy's public sector."

What exactly this intense activity is involved in is acknowledged further on, where it is reported that the increase in the income in the public sector is due to public construction, and to the three-percent increase in the real income from public administration-insurance-health-education which, as is explained, is owing to the

appointments made at the end of 1982 and during 1983 in public administration, in social insurance organizations, local self-administration and the NPDD [Legal Entities of Public Law].

So, PASOK's favoritism is distinguishing itself as the first productive branch of the economy!

Mr. Papandreou himself has repeatedly acknowledged that the uncontrolled swelling of the state deficits undermines monetary stability and fires inflation: The total deficit in the public sector, from 302 billion in 1981 and 340 billion in 1982, will be close to 450 billion in 1983.

Alongside this crushing deficit, a new one is now beginning to be created which will be equally great in a few years. This is the deficit in private enterprises which are coming under the state's control.

Suppression of Private Initiative

2. Within the first two years of its power, PASOK nationalized five of the ten largest industries in Greece, PYRKAL, LARKO, ESSO, Iraklis-AGET [General Cement Corporation] and Peiraklis-Petraikis, while as Zalokosta conveys in the government press, the nationalization of another ten is imminent. With PASOK, we are thus coming into the little Middle Ages--of the comic review--and will rendezvous with the third industrial revolution, equipped with artisanship and the public enterprises!

The country is gradually being led to deindustrialization. In 1979, manufacturing had a 21.8-percent share in formation of the national income; now that share has decreased to 20 percent, and as SEV [Association of Greek Industrialists] very correctly estimates, in a few years we will become an agricultural and tourist country.

As was stressed recently in Salonica by KODISO [Democratic Socialism Party] President I. Pasmazoglou, in the days of PASOK, private entrepreneurial responsibility is being undermined and thrown over. Three categories of government actions, as well as the general drop in confidence, have caused the gravest negative result:

1. The law on problematic businesses brandishes a vague threat and diffuses uncertainty over all the enterprises, since they are possibly subject to irresponsible and uncontrolled procedures.
2. The supervisory councils are tantamount to assemblage of a party parastate.
3. The demagogic defamation of enterprises.

The Foreign Debt

3. The swelling of the foreign public debt, in combination with the weakening of domestic production, are leading to recourse to greater and greater foreign borrowing, thus undermining the country's independence and accumulating burdens on coming generations (KATHIMERINI, 31 July). It is characteristic that in the ten months August 1982 to July 1983, the PASOK government borrowed from abroad 2,006 million dollars, versus 1,522 and 1,270 in the same periods of 1981/1982 and 1980/1981.

VAN AARDENNE ON NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES, BUDGET

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD in Dutch 24 Sep 83 p 22-24

[Interview with doctoral candidate Gijs van Aardenne, vice prime minister and minister of economic affairs, by correspondents Johan van Den Bossche and Nico van Grieken]

[Text] The pragmatic attitude of the liberal minister of economic affairs and vice prime minister remains inflexible. "The number of family providers can only expand if they are willing to work with a benefit. Otherwise, we will not have any money left over."

New economic policy. A break in the trend.

The first and at the same time also famous report of the Wagner Committee in the English language called it a new spirit for industry. Gerrit Wagner, former Shell director, proclaimed "the new industrial awakening" which had to arouse the Netherlands. That was in June 1981.

However, the budget of minister of economic affairs for that year, Dr Jan Terlouw, indicated that the Dutch economy "would be involved in a futile process of contraction and pauperization and that investments would no longer recover, if the financial elbow room of the enterprises was not soon definitely expanded." That was a prediction of disaster which speaks for itself.

The present minister of economic affairs and vice prime minister, doctoral candidate, Gijs van Aardenne, (53) was asked: Why has that new industrial awakening disappeared? Where is it? Where does it appear? What is it producing? The minister, who at that time was seated on a bench for two, was dragged through the Dutch economy for almost an hour and a half.

"More initiative, more investments are appearing. I think that those are going to attract. A more optimistic attitude in the

community is also visible. Just look at the stock quotations. There is a definite change. But the most important thing is that profit is no longer a dirty word, that we say profit is necessary and that, perhaps even more important, the abhorrence of technology is going to leave us somewhat."

Van Aardenne remembers the past, "that abhorrence was cultivated. I called it more than once a social studies mentality: the social studies, really a sort of distorted law and humanities orientation, developed a sort of antipathy for studies of science and medicine. Science and medicine were disgusting and wrong. We had to live on this small earth and eat our own food, not realizing that a quarter of humanity, which still manages to eat moderately, can then completely forget it. But good, that does not matter at all. It was a general opinion."

The minister resumes and continues: "Where were the universities overcrowded? That happened in languages and history, also in medicine, but that is not a purely scientific subject. However, the technical institutes had no problem, there were places left over. The attitude is now changing. I do not know why. I continually ask myself, why there was a cultural revolution in the sixties. I am not well grounded enough to be able to describe it all."

But we are not sitting with the minister for that purpose. The excursion back to those days is interesting. However, the question what 1984 and the following year will mean for Dutch business, unemployment and social security and Van Aardenne's policy is more interesting.

Just as with his social partner, VNO [Federation of Netherlands Enterprises], chairman, Chris van Veen, moderate optimism predominates with the liberal minister. There is also justified modesty about the "break in the trend": The slight drop of the financial deficit and the decline of the pressure of taxation, together over 1 percent of the national income. Van Aardenne: "That has not yet appeared. I think that the strict economy program of 12 billion guilders contributes to it. We have said: Keep the pressure of taxation constant, perhaps with postponements, but still constant and let the benefit pressure drop. On the whole that is expressed in a drop of taxation and benefit pressure of 0.9 percent and a drop of the financial deficit of 0.3 percent. That is modest, not so dreadfully much. We also could have let the financial deficit drop a bit more, but that then would have meant a heavy increase in taxation."

Benefit pressure

[Question] Do you mean benefit pressure for business or for the employees?

[Answer] Mainly for the citizens, in the case of taxation pressure, it acts as a relief for business and an increase for the citizens. Moreover, the increase of taxation is less than the reduction of the benefit for the citizen. Consequently, it helps them somewhat.

[Question] And business?

The tax reduction measures amount to 1.5 billion guilders on a yearly basis. Partnership taxation amounts to 775 million guilders. Then you still get the independent deduction, 225 million guilders and innovation stimulus measures. There are also investment subsidies for shipping and some few measures out of the report on medium size and small business.

In addition, there is the limited buildup of vacation days in case of sickness. The civil code must be changed for this purpose. Then there is no more obligation for the employer to build up vacation rights. The social partners must then negotiate that. To state in the law that it is no longer allowed would then be an interference in the collective labor agreements and that is, as you know, always to the government's disadvantage. We are only removing an obstacle.

Business definitely gets something out of it. A lowering of partnership taxation by 5 percent is a considerable reduction. It is now 48 percent, it will be 43 percent. That rate reduction of 5 percent is one of the few things which has not leaked out, he says with a short laugh.

I think that business will receive this favorably, especially businesses which are losing money, for they do not pay any partnership taxation. But next year there is somewhat more chance of profit, the business outlook is attractive, therefore the reduction fits in well with the international picture. Moreover, the reduction was the employers' first priority, I understood it from them. They preferred that.

[Question] That is still remarkable. Many businesses are making little or no profit. Consequently reduction of partnership taxation is no incentive to more employment.

[Answer] But probably an incentive to improving their profitability. The Dutch competitive position improves. Our position

is not unfavorable. The increase of wage and energy costs is declining. The Netherlands is succeeding in improving its share in an attractive world trade. World trade is increasing by 4 percent and our export is increasing by 5 percent, actual figures.

Consequently our share of world trade is increasing. Obviously we are not doing so badly. It is not natural gas in every case, for its export is not increasing. Naturally it would be better if it was more, but at least it is something. For that matter, there is still the carry-back measure, through which businesses can balance former profits with possible losses today.

[Question] Is all that sufficient for business recovery?

[Answer] What is sufficient? I would like to do more, that is always true. But if you do more, it is charged to the financial deficit. It does not work out, if I would reduce taxes even more and would let the deficit increase. For business pays the price in interest and a disjointed monetary system.

But if I reduce private consumption further, employers such as Albert Heijn complain because I am overdoing things. Consequently: they object whether it comes from a reduction of private consumption or an increase of the deficit. And then I do not even mention the political problems. There is not a third option. Well, consumption is still too high and can very well drop a little bit more next year. Combined with the slight drop of the deficit, I do not think our mix is bad.

Why is it a good time to stop the rise of the financial deficit? Because the world economy precisely now is improving somewhat. As it were, there is a built-in stimulus in it.

Leak away

[Question] On one hand, you are reducing consumption opportunities, and at the same time you want to encourage investments. However, is anyone interested in making investments, if there is no purchasing power?

[Answer] That story appears like it was the same in the whole world. It would also hold good if the Netherlands was an autarchy. Domestic consumption is based to a great extent on imported goods. Consequently if you could only protect something in the domestic sphere.

[Question] You mean the leaking away of stimulants abroad.

[Answer] Yes, if you only increase consumption opportunities, then half goes abroad. If you direct the stimulus, for example, toward additional construction efforts, using as many employees as possible, who now have a benefit, then you use that stimulus in your own economy.

[Question] Do you not expect that business will invest more, now that you have substantially reduced the rate of partnership taxation? For it is certainly a measure which will cause the financial deficit to rise.

[Answer] The deficit is reduced less by it. The measure aims at increasing investment opportunities. Many enterprises struggle with too few assets of their own; that balance is misrepresented. The reduction of partnership taxation is therefore a contribution to increasing their own assets. It was just as good as the stock and property deduction which took place this year. The previous cabinet still announced that not unimportant measure. If we take such a step every year, that improves the business position. Then they can invest, even if the profit is smaller as a result of fewer sales.

[Question] Consequently that reduction of 5 percent cannot lead, for the time being, to more employment.

[Answer] No, but in the long run, an improved economy creates employment. It is a frequent, mistaken idea that you must create work as such. That naturally is only possible temporarily: You pump up land or build a road. If you really want to work permanently, there must be a sound economy. The system must operate. That system consists of a public and a private sector. It does not work without a public sector. Then the private sector does not function. You absolutely need education and public health. But then the public sector should not be overvalued, as was the case for years. With that high financial deficit, we have wound up in an unproductive cycle. Not unproductive in the sense that things such as education are not necessary--naturally public facilities are necessary--but in the sense that there is no direct return.

Additional

[Question] Still you have come out with an employment report, which makes it possible to work, while retaining a benefit.

[Answer] The employment report is concerned both with the market as well as the public sector. And there must be additional work.

[Question] In the quarternary sector, 125,000 people are being considered for work while retaining a benefit.

[Answer] That is in the report's supplement. That is still no policy decision, but a subject for discussion for the Labor Foundation. For that matter, it is striking that even the employers and employees in construction talk about work with retention of benefit. If both parties want something like that jointly, as a government, you must not try to be opinionated. However, the fear of unfair competition exists, but that is a question of inspection.

[Question] Consequently there is an inspection committee which says whether the work is unfair competition or not. What a bureaucracy.

[Answer] Yes, but it will probably come. Municipalities let all work with retention of the benefit. We must definitely keep an eye on that. A potato digger with a benefit can do that because he will take the bread out of the mouths of few other potato diggers, but in the case of gardeners we must watch out. They complain of unfair competition through work with retention of a benefit.

It is not simple. A small printing shop which operates with recipients of benefits can go under the market price and consequently compete unfairly. The situation is otherwise in the quarternary sector. There we can, for example, increase the number of family providers, but we do not have enough money for that. We do have enough, if it costs less. Now, unemployed family providers get less money because they receive a benefit, consequently they can decide: whether to stay at home or work with a benefit. We obviously do not intend to pay full wages any more.

[Question] The report probably will not contribute to economic recovery.

[Answer] Let me speak about that: the report is broken up into a market section with a tax reduction program plus a 1 billion program which in a certain sense contributes to economic recovery and into a section which aids the restoration of employment by redistribution of labor.

[Question] You reported a break in the trend in the development of the financial budget and taxation and benefit pressure. Another break in the trend is that you have discontinued almost all support to business. Is this a question of a change in outlook or merely a lack of money?

[Answer] The support has not been discontinued. It is true that I am doing less of it. I always say: The break in the trend was when I refused to support Van Gelder stock 6 weeks before the elections. That was the break in the trend. Therefore, it was not possible to give anymore to a large firm, which moreover was absolutely doomed to death.

Yes, that support worked in a number of cases, but Okto was certainly not a success. I was obliged to discontinue that support a year earlier. In Okto much more government money per job was invested than in RSV [expansion unknown]. We sometimes forget that. Okto is really the model of a bad business.

Actually the ratio is fifty-fifty. That is too little success with government support, certainly in a period in which you have less funds. Individual support of a business is, in principle, not good. But you always have exceptions. Well, if there is much money, then the exceptions are advocated more forcefully, even in the Second Chamber, although there is more understanding for my policy. A few years ago only, it was more difficult to go against it. Once more, I see Okto, the business which was forced on the North by the government. Okto was the best of all. And there was Okto.

Trends

[Question] Your support policy therefore originates partly from lack of money and from the idea that businesses, certainly if there is a threat of unfair competition, as in the case of Okto, must not be assisted too long. How does such a rigid policy turn out, where your predecessor in his budget for this year still mentioned a hopeless process of contraction and pauperization.

[Answer] I do not say that we are going irrevocably in the direction of contraction and pauperization. I think that profitability has even become more favorable this year. The development in wage costs has contributed to that. I do know, it is too small, but there are trends.

How will it go if a poor fellow again comes to economic affairs, who cannot do any more, makes no more profit and wants support because otherwise a hundred men will be on the street? I must then say: It is a dreadful pity, but I cannot start, with over 800,000 unemployed, to give special treatment, only because you have done it wrong. I am only ready to make an exception if a business has a future. That is the only criterion.

[Question] VNO chairman, Van Veen is less cheerful than you. He thinks many positive developments depend on the fact that many depleted stocks must again be replenished.

[Answer] I think that the attraction of the economy is more than only catching up with demand. If we really were in a declining line of recession, then they would not even replenish the supplies. The fact that still happens indicates the expectation exists that we are overcoming our economic problems.

[Question] And the government has contributed to that?

[Answer] In a limited way, we naturally are not contributing to the recovery of the world economy. We do see to it that Dutch business has better opportunities to take advantage of the international revival. I see, in spite of the monetary risks and the still very high interest, that the recovery is taking place.

[Question] You perhaps mean your industry policy, but what have things called innovation policy, technology policy and industry policy produced? An unemployed person would say that he does not want any policy, but a job.

[Answer] Without industry policy, that job will not appear. Naturally, it is essential that business take advantage of opportunities, otherwise it will not succeed. If business does nothing, then regardless of what the government does, we will not get out of it.

We have the MIP [Social Industrial Projects], for example. I regard it as a source of financing. A reservoir of low risk capital which the government obviously can easily attract (the minister recalls the recent placing of a state loan of 4 billion--editor) and its conversion into risk bearing capital. That is the government's lubricating function. However, the MIP is not a miracle worker.

A reindustrialization policy also means that the knowledge of universities and colleges is mobilized on behalf of business. The technology project policy is organized for that purpose. Next year there must be a plan. I am confident that business will take up such things.

The government itself does not fund any business. Although that could perhaps happen occasionally. The state mines were established by a liberal minister, consequently there is nothing against it. But government businesses on a broad scale are dead.

Positive

[Question] Yes, but what is your industry policy producing now?

[Answer] A lot of businesses are starting up. There are many new activities. Take a development, as in the case of Philips, definitely positive. We support such renovations even with development credits. The government definitely favors in its industry policy new production processes, such as in the case of Pokker. That enterprise has, meanwhile, paid back its development assistance. The Netherlands is really not dead. What does happen is that the wave of automation provides fewer people with jobs. Jobs are eliminated. However that is a process which has been going on for a hundred years. And now there comes together, all at the same time,--great demand for jobs, women who want to work, recession and sales problems--we must try to absorb that by obtaining a loan for reduction of working hours.

[Question] Export opportunities are increasing, we conclude from your remarks about the rising share of the Netherlands on the world market. Why then do employers still complain that you are abolishing measures which encourage exports?

[Answer] I think that the employer who does not complain will be suspected of making too much profit. Then he is taxed with that. For every group in the community, it is clear that it always must be emphasized that he or she is not prosperous. As soon as people think that a definite group is successful, then they actually get nothing more. And abolishing those measures is not true. If something is abolished here as there, it is because the regulation hardly worked. Then you can use the money better. If export is going well, you do not need, as a government, to spend any tax money there.

[Question] Then your price policy. You have given that up. Does that increase the chance of inflation?

[Answer] The aim of price policy is anti-inflationary. Moreover, you only slow down inflation with price policy. You level off the wage and price spiral with it somewhat. However wages are now restrained and inflation is low. Consequently I do not need to conduct any price policy, except in cases where competition does not work. But I keep my finger on the pulse. If we again have an oil crisis, because the war between Iraq and Iran gets out of hand, then I will again introduce price policy.

Let me say this: price policy is certainly abandoned, but the Price Law has not been repeated. That law is something like the state of seige. You declare that if it is necessary, otherwise

you do not proclaim it. The way business is going normally now, inflation is not a threat. With too large an amount of money that would be possible, but then I would immediately resort to price policy.

Consequently a price policy only brakes inflation exclusively. You postpone its effect on prices. Naturally you never continue that long because, otherwise businesses will go bankrupt.

[Question] Do the municipalities fall under the Price Law?

[Answer] No they do not in most of their activities.

[Question] Consequently, if the central government delegates more and more to the municipalities, the citizen is always more the victim, because the municipalities will then see a chance to pay off their deficits by higher taxes and rates. Who then keeps the communities under control?

[Answer] Nobody. In theory, that is an internal matter, but there one is extremely cautious because of municipal autonomy. Essentially, you can say the municipal council takes care of taxes. The council must then only decide not to widen a street. If the decision is yes, then taxes must go up.

[Question] Your ministry earmarked about 1.5 billion guilders for industry policy in 1983. And for 1984?

[Answer] It will also be something like that for 1984. There are 1.7 billion guilders available.

[Question] How is the "gentlemen's agreement" going?

[Answer] Good. I call it gentlemen's agreement because that is a legal concept.

[Question] Can you give us examples of investments which have resulted from agreements with the oil companies?

[Answer] Soon I will come out with something like that as a first effort for the flexicoker. Everything is running precisely according to plan. The investments are attractive. However, in the preparatory period, no result can really be announced yet. Terlow especially is concerned about it. But it is not his fault that nothing can be said yet.

[Question] It is remarkable that nobody is now standing up in the chamber and saying that it is a good agreement.

[Answer] No, you do not hear that. So it goes. At the time, they thought there was something to get out of it politically.

[Question] Natural gas policy causes anxiety. Would you not get Spierenburg in line again to lower prices abroad this time and thus increase sales?

[Answer] I do not need Spierenburg for price reductions. However, I do not know if we must increase sales so much. The natural gas supplies are dropping less rapidly than we had thought, but our export contracts expire in the nineties. And then they are gone, for others will fill that up, the Russians, for example. What now is coming up for discussion is that we will try to postpone the final date of those contracts.

Consequently we are not selling more. I am also not unhappy that the sales are on a lower level, when that lower level runs much longer. We are spreading sales out more, that is better than concluding more short term contracts, if that would be possible. Eventually I want to bring up a sort of availability premium, so that the Netherlands can deliver gas if another shuts off the tap.

Look, one is now exchanging the Arabs for the Russians in Europe. There is gas in the Netherlands, there is gas in Norway and an awful lot of gas in Russia, much more than with us. That naturally involves risks for western Europe.

Nine cents

[Question] How high is the gas price going for the citizens?

[Answer] If it depends on me a little over 3 cents VAT [Value Added Tax]. It was 4.7 percent in last year's estimates. I said I wanted a smaller increase. That has happened and colleague Ruding made a proposal of 125 million guilders. In this cabinet period I am aiming at a total increase of 9 cents, consequently 3 times 3 cents.

[Question] All the same, a step toward state support. Is Hoogovens [blast furnaces] still getting that billion?

[Answer] Hoogovens has a promise and that is being carried out in principle. But that support must naturally be in proportion to the reductions in capacities of the European Commission. Moreover, half of that billion desired by Hoogovens is intended for the decartelization with Hoesch.

[Question] What does European commissioner Andriessen think of that now?

[Answer] Andriessen thinks that Hoogovens must reduce its capacity more than was intended. If this is not done, then there will be problems. Then the support will not be approved.

[Question] A quite different dialogue is that between the cabinet and the trade union movement. FNV [Netherlands Trade Union Federation] Chairman Kok emphasized that once again.

[Answer] A dialogue is always useful, but you must also reach conclusions at a given moment. An example: the redistribution of available work was first brought up for discussion by the trade union movement. The employer did not want it. The politicians were also somewhat averse. Consequently I think that the trade union movement has scored a point that this has been accepted. But if the trade union movement, on the other hand, says that the financial deficit must be kept high or can even rise temporarily, then I say that the trade union movement does not score there. You cannot have everything.

[Question] Still the trade unions, especially the FNV, have become somewhat more realistic in their ideas.

[Answer] That is true. Necessity is the mother of invention.

[Question] But that same necessity threatens to weaken the trade union movement. Do you applaud that? Must the trade union again become a direct pressure group?

[Answer] I believe that we should not get involved there. Direct pressure naturally sounds very nice, but precisely a trade union must operate on a somewhat longer term. The decline of the trade union movement and their loss of members are alarming. When a party to a discussion goes to pieces, it is not desirable. That is true, moreover, with the understandable differences in the trade union movement. The interest of the industrial unions and the public service unions no longer parallel each other. At this time, being the chairman of a trade union federation seems to me to be one of the most difficult jobs in our country. But applauding a deterioration of the trade union movement? Never.

TURKISH-ARAB CHAMBER OF COMMERCE CALL FOR BOLSTERED TRADE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Sep 83 pp 1,11

[Text] Minister of Trade Kemal Canturk stated that the general outlines of the economies of the Arab nations and Turkey paint a picture of complementarity and support of one another. Canturk, who gave a speech at the sixth session of the Turkish-Arab Joint Chamber of Commerce meeting that opened yesterday in Istanbul, pointed out that it is not possible to think of economic relations only within the restricted framework of the buying and selling of goods. He said, "It would be a more realistic approach to include infrastructural services, tourism, banking, and other service fields in economic relations."

The opening address of the sixth session of the Turkish-Arab Joint Chamber of Commerce meeting, which began yesterday morning at the Istanbul Hilton with the reading of a section of the Koran, was made by Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchanges Administrative Council Chairman Mehmet Yazar. Stating that "the region in which we are located has, unfortunately, become an arena of serious conflict," Yazar noted that the Turkish-Arab Joint Chamber of Commerce will also be able to be of service in solving disagreements.

In his speech, Yazar called attention to Turkey's developed industries, powerful production potential, development within the service sector, labor force potential, and natural resources and stressed that the Arab nations possess rich oil reserves, experience in international trade, and vast financial resources. Yazar noted that the intelligent use of these complementary resources will be able to ensure strong development in the region.

Minister of Trade Canturk spoke at the meeting, emphasizing that the importance placed by Turkey on the development of reciprocal trade and economic relations with the Arab countries is clearly yielding positive results. He drew attention to developments made in exportation and importation and said, "The inclusion of all sorts of goods on our export lists gives us justified hope that our trade will reach an even higher level." Canturk stated that it is necessary that economic relations not be evaluated within the restricted framework of the purchase and sale of goods alone and that infrastructural services, tourism, banking, and other service fields be included within these relations. He pointed out that very beneficial economic developments will be ensured from a transition to activity in the form of joint Turkish-Arab capital enterprises.

Whereas Turkish speakers at the meeting mentioned the complementary characteristics of the economies of the Arab nations and Turkey and the benefits of co-operation between Turkish technology and Arab capital, several Arab speakers emphasized the importance of ensuring a trade balance.

Turkey's Exportation to Turkish-Arab Joint Chamber of Commerce Member Countries

	Jan-June 1983 (million dollars)	Jan-June 1982
Saudi Arabia	134.5	119.1
Libya	111.0	140.7
Iraq	98.3	403.2
Algeria	65.6	62.6
Lebanon	61.1	48.9
Jordan	38.4	31.1
Syria	34.9	33.2
Kuwait	34.3	35.8
Tunisia	27.5	12.1
Qatar	2.8	1.2
Sudan	2.2	1.9
Bahrain	0.9	0.8
Oman	-	0.5
Total	611.5	890.1

Exports to 13 Nations Reduced 30 Percent

Our exportation to the Turkish-Arab Joint Chamber of Commerce member nations fell during the first 6 months of this year by 30 percent -- to approximately \$612 million -- in comparison with the same period last year. Exportation to these nations during the first half of 1982 was \$890 million. Whereas 35 percent of Turkey's exports during the first half of last year went to these nations, the amount fell to 23 percent this year.

The major reason for this decline was the reduction in exports to Iraq by about \$300 million -- to below \$100 million -- in the first 6 months of this year. Exports to Arab countries other than Iraq increased slightly this year.

11673

CSO: 3554/18

DOWNGRADING OF FOREIGN TRADE GOALS FOR 1984

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 27 Sep 83 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara--The policy to encourage foreign trade that was put into effect following the 24 January decisions has been abandoned in the 1984 temporary program. As it has become impossible to achieve in 1983 the volume of foreign trade envisioned previously, the 1984 goals have been lowered to below the initial predictions for 1983.

The policy to broaden foreign economic relations was set aside when sought-after success could not be ensured from institution of, concomitant with the 24 January decisions, the policy of opening trade to the outside world. When it was understood that the volume of foreign trade, expected to reach \$17.1 billion in the 1983 economic program, would only amount to \$15.4 billion, the 1984 foreign-trade volume estimate was reduced to \$16.4 billion, a figure lower than the 1983 foreign-trade volume estimate. Thus, it has been admitted that the goals for 1983 within the policy to encourage foreign trade will not be able to be reached in 1984 either. The reduction of trade volume is the result of the failure to meet export and import targets. When it was understood that exports, estimated at \$7.1 billion in the 1983 program, would remain at \$6.25 billion, the 1984 export goal was set below that of the initial 1983 predictions, at \$6.85 billion. Because it was acknowledged that 1983 imports, previously planned at \$10 billion, would be \$9.15 billion, this time the 1984 target was fixed at \$9.55 billion, a figure below \$10 billion.

When the possibility of expected progress in foreign-trade volume was eliminated, it was admitted in the 1984 program that there is a trend toward reduction in workers' foreign exchange deposits. Following acknowledgement that workers' foreign exchange revenues, which were estimated at \$2.55 billion in the 1983 program, would only amount to \$1.85 billion, the amount of foreign exchange secured in this manner in 1984 was estimated at \$1,875,000,000. The same situation occurred in regard to foreign capital entries. Foreign capital entries, foreseen as \$125 million in the 1983 program, will actually amount to \$70 million and are predicted to rise to \$85 million in 1984. When it was determined in the 1983 program that the year's net foreign exchange secured from foreign capital would be \$60 million after profit transfers were made, it was understood that \$5 million of this would be used for foreign exchange outlays. According to revised balance-of-payments calculations, in 1983, there will be profit transfers of \$75 million as opposed to \$70 million in foreign capital income.

According to 1984 balance-of-payments estimates, \$1,865,000,000 of the year's \$2.7-billion foreign-trade deficit will be covered by the surplus obtained through unseen operations. In this way, there will be an \$835-million deficit in the normal operations balance. The \$420-million positive difference in capital transactions will reduce the general balance deficit to \$415 million. The net payment of \$106 million to the IMF that is planned in 1984 and payments using resources of \$521 million to be created by short and moderate-term capital transactions will serve to balance this budget.

According to 1984 balance-of-payments estimates drafted by the State Planning Organization and approved by the Council of Ministers, tourism income will provide \$325 million, and \$950 million will be obtained from "other unseen entries." In 1984, foreign-debt interest payments will total \$1,225,000,000, and \$1,220,000,000 will go toward foreign-debt principal payments. The amount of \$500 million will be obtained for program credit and \$900 million as project credit. It is agreed that there will be no change in reserves.

11673

CSO: 3554/18

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS TURKEY TERMED OFFENSIVE

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 13 Sep 83 p 1

[Text] First PASOK wanted Greece out of NATO and the EEC. Now not only is it staying in NATO, it is perpetuating for dollars the U.S. bases on Greek soil. Now not only is it remaining in the EEC, it is holding the presidency...! When the Polish problem was at a very critical point, the PASOK government almost boycotted the EEC's common policy against Jaruzelski. When Europe was thinking responsibly about the Euromissiles issue, the PASOK government heedlessly differentiated its position from its allies....

All these would have no special significance for us Cypriots if Greece were not our mother and our hope. We (the small and weak) would have no say if our own fate did not depend on the fate of Greece. A dignified, serious, responsible, powerful and, chiefly, respected Greece would be a well-founded hope for the survival of Cypriot Hellenism. But a foreign policy of Greece which enrages its allies and sweetens its adversaries is a direct danger for us....

Aside from the generally contradictory, and often Don Quixoteistic, foreign policy, there is also official Athens' more particular policy vis-a-vis the Turks. A few months ago it was revealed with pride that agreements had been signed between Greece and Turkey for closer tourist relations. A few days ago it was published, without being denied, that Greece has agreed to import lemons from Turkey, namely, from northern Cyprus! Now it is disclosed to us that Mr. Kharalambopoulos made demarches to Bonn because Germany is arresting and handing over to Evren wanted Turks....

Is Turkey Turkizing Cyprus or not? Is Ankara of the dictator Evren or the blood-stained social-democratic Ecevit threatening half of the Aegean or not? Are the Turkish troops in northern Cyprus ready to advance and seize all of Cyprus? What is of concern to Mr. Kharalambopoulos? Evren's junta? If it falls and the democratic grey wolves of Demirel and Ecevit come, will the attack against Greece and Cyprus be ended or will it be more threatening?

Hundreds of similar questions could be submitted with a broken spirit by every Greek Cypriot to the PASOK government. But what significance can these terrible questions have when "the sun which would rise above Cyprus" has shrunk to an imported Turkish lemon? What significance can they have when one day Papandreou unyieldingly seeks for the Turkish troops to leave Cyprus and at the same hour his government is developing tourism and commerce with Turkey?

Two years ago Papandreou was a new troubadour of Cypriot freedom. He came here with fiery words. He encouraged, he promised, he made dreams.... Now? Now when Turkey says every day that Cyprus and the Aegean are "an extension of Turkey," what does he do? Since 1974 (and long before) Greece has been drawn up in battle array against Turkey. What could be the advantage of the lemons, tourists and support of Evren's victims? All of Cyprus is a victim of Evren and all the others driven out by Evren! Instead of Mr. Kharalambopoulos seeing what we will become and what the Aegean will suffer, he wants to save those allegedly persecuted by the Turkish dictator...!!

Athens' concern should not be the return of democracy to Turkey: First, because it has more urgent problems of its own; second, because the nation of the Greeks, will have the unyielding expansionism of the Turks whether there is a dictatorship or not in Turkey; and, third, because a Turkish dictatorship is formally disdained internationally. What does Greece's Ministry of Foreign Affairs want? Does it want democracy in Turkey so that country can become stronger internationally? More important, more respected? With all respect and inexpressible pain, we could not avoid expressing publicly this humiliating bitterness of ours. Precisely as for other reasons, in other years, we expressed an analogous bitterness with Karamanlis and Rallis....!

4267

1000: 3021/5

NEWSPAPERS GIVE VIEWS ON KOIVISTO ADDRESS TO UNITED NATIONS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Sep 83 p 6

[Article: "Other Papers"]

[Text] President Koivisto's speech at the United Nations was the number one subject of yesterday's lead articles as expected.

Optimistic Sermon of Reproach

AAMULEHTI (Conservative) of Tampere characterized Koivisto's speech as a sermon of reproach to the superpowers, but which also contained a dose of optimism.

President Mauno Koivisto did not join the most gloomy pessimists on Thursday at the UN General Assembly. "We have faith in the United Nations," he assured his prestigious audience. He also saw reason for cautious optimism in the international situation in spite of the increase in tensions. The CSCE was brought to a successful conclusion, and there seems to be a sufficient desire to limit nuclear weapons.

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, President Koivisto stated that no reasonable political goals can be promoted by their means. This, of course, is generally known, but the hoped-for moral courage and healthy reason in the simple elimination of the danger of nuclear weapons have been lacking from the governments concerned and the whole international community.

Small movements, however, occur continuously as can be seen from Vice President George Bush's statement on Wednesday. Now for the first time the United States has hinted at the possibility that France's and England's missiles could also be counted in Europe's missile game -- or it has come a step closer to the Soviet Union.

Koivisto's carefully considered 'sermon' to the superpowers also contained an assurance of the continuity of Finland's policy line and our country's desire "to demonstrate a constructive and active role as a member of the international community". Finland, for its part, has reduced the threat of nuclear war by obligating itself to an unconditional non-nuclear status. This decision can serve as a model for many others, and the nuclear states could

help by reducing unreasonable stockpiles and by making safety guarantees more effective.

On Behalf of UN Authority

In the opinion of SUOMENMAA (Center Party) Koivisto has words of wisdom to say about the UN's role, which regrettably are not easily accomplished.

According to Koivisto, the disparaging attitude toward the United Nations is based on short-sighted calculations and political expediency. The consequences of this undermining of the UN's prestige are tragic to all parties.

In his speech the president did not join in that choir which has made the UN into a propaganda forum for accomplishing whatever objectives. On the contrary, Koivisto hoped that emotions would be brought under control and that it would be possible to accomplish a reasonable dialogue in spite of the differences in views existing between the states.

Koivisto's speech was the wise counsel of the leader of a small peace-loving country to a world afflicted with conflicts. The future of the world can only lie in cooperation between nations and peoples, of which the UN is one of the most important forums. The greater the prestige of the UN, the better the security of each of its member nations.

Finland's hope for a more prestigious UN will regrettably not be accomplished in the near future. However, work on behalf of security must not be allowed to slide. The accomplishment of the guidelines presented in the president's UN speech would make the world a much safer place in which to live.

According to the Feelings of the Finnish People

KANSAN UTISET (Finnish People's Democratic League) states that Koivisto expressed our nation's opinion well, which can also be interpreted as a strengthening of the peace movement.

The merit of President Koivisto's speech at the UN General Assembly was in the fact that from the forum of this world organization he was able to convey in a genuine manner the concerns of the Finnish people and their growing unrest as a result of increasing international tensions and distrust.

His speech concentrated on two major problem groups, the UN's ability to function and the tragic threat being created by nuclear weapons to the whole world. He appealed rather forcefully to the leading nuclear powers to find a negotiated solution. "Security will not be increased by procuring and deploying new, more destructive nuclear weapons, but by limiting and reducing them. International cooperation presupposes that a dialogue between the nuclear states will turn the arms race around," emphasized the president in expressing the most sincere hope of the Finnish people, which at this time, among other things, is manifesting itself as a broad movement against the so-called Euro-missiles and for a nuclear-free Nordic zone.

Koivisto's Own Path

Uusi Suomi (Independent) emphasizes the personal significance of the speech from President Koivisto's point of view: He has now found his own path as a representative of our traditional foreign policy in the world.

It is interesting to compare Kekkonen's and Koivisto's speeches with each other. More than two decades ago Kekkonen defined Finland's policy in the UN and elsewhere by stating that we see ourselves more in the role of physician than a judge. Even then the president also wanted to explain Finland's position on the political map of the world as thoroughly as possible.

This speech delivered in 1961 did not contain any criticism directed against the operational capabilities of the world organization, but already 10 years later Kekkonen stated that "the United Nations is hindered by an atmosphere of disappointment caused by illusions and incorrect impressions".

Now Koivisto was even more detailed in evaluating the position of the UN. Nearly all of his speech dealt with hopes concerning the development of the organization's ability to function. We know very well from where this tone originates. All over the world and particularly in the small neutral countries there is profound disappointment in an international atmosphere consumed by conflicts. Today the UN more often reflects disappointments than achievements.

Koivisto placed special emphasis on the UN as a forum for dialogue, in which all countries should have an opportunity to freely participate. It remains unknown whether by this statement the president meant Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was not present at the UN for reasons known to everyone.

Approval for Finland's Policy

[Editorial Comment from HELSINGIN SANOMAT 29 September 1983 p 2]

The U.S. government supports Finland's internationally recognized neutrality, stated President Ronald Reagan on Tuesday in the White House rose garden in concluding his visit with President Mauno Koivisto.

In Finland there is every reason for complete satisfaction with Reagan's statement. This decisively advances the assurance of more than 20 years ago, which President John Kennedy gave to President Urho Kekkonen in 1961.

The difference between the statements made by Kennedy and Reagan should be noted. Kennedy stated that the obligations based on Finland's treaties or the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact are to be taken into consideration and he made it known that the bases of the political neutrality carried out by Finland are understood in America.

Reagan, on the other hand, considers Finland's neutrality already as a fact that has received international recognition.

It is certainly evident that the President of the United States is not disputing the significance of the YYA Pact by his statement. Indeed, the agreement is one of the founding pillars of Finland's neutrality and Finland's aspiration to carry out a neutral policy is recognized in it.

In the course of the last two decades and even somewhat before Finland has, indeed, received international recognition for its neutral policy in the countries of the West as well as the countries of the East.

Only 10 days have passed since President Reagan's speech, in which he outlined the concept of drawing neutral and nonaligned countries into the U.S. sphere of influence. After the meeting between the two presidents it has become clear that the United States does not include Finland among those countries whose policy of neutrality is one-sided and indecisive.

Some other profoundly satisfying issues became evident from the statements made in the White House rose garden. Koivisto made it known to his host that Finland is striving to achieve a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area and that Finland wants to see the advancement of disarmament, including the demand to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, particularly in Europe.

However, the visit of Finland's president to Washington has remained a marginal news item, and Reagan's statement on Finland's neutrality did not provide copy for the American press. This is no cause for offence in Finland, since nothing can more effectively measure the political weight of a small, neutral and distant country.

Even though the Americans react to Finland's neutrality as a routine matter, it is to Finland's benefit to observe the continuity of its foreign policy. Koivisto has continued the YYA Pact and has made a significant number of visits abroad. The strained international situation is no cause for joy, but there is still no cause in Finland to see a black lining around every cloud. Also not every success is necessarily followed by a rebound.

10/76

OSD: 3617/5

KORHONEN IN UN ADDRESS ATTACKS SUPERPOWERS FOR TENSIONS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Hannu Vuori: "UN Activities Suffer From Propaganda"]

[Text] The problem at the United Nations is not that the superpowers argue there, states Finland's UN Ambassador Keijo Korhonen. The problem is that their attitude toward the UN is indifferent.

In an interview granted to the Finnish News Bureau STT in the beginning of September Ambassador Korhonen noted that the UN and the UN General Assembly, in particular, are very much political organs. The international political situation and relations between the superpowers, in particular, give them their character, but this does not come from the superpowers only. In this respect UN activity has been at the bottom for several years already according to Korhonen.

The annual fall session of the UN General Assembly begins on 20 September. This time an unusually large number of heads of states will participate in the General Assembly session. President Mauno Koivisto will address this session in connection with his trip to the United States. He will deliver Finland's speech at the general session of the General Assembly on 29 September.

"The UN's problem at this time is not what was feared would become a problem in the 1950's and 1960's. Namely that the superpowers would quarrel there. They do not quarrel very much in the UN. The UN's problem is that the superpowers do not attempt to use it to their advantage. This is, of course, much worse. Their attitude is neither cold nor hot, but one of growing indifference," states Korhonen.

According to him, there is a group of issues which the superpowers consider to be so vital to their own interests that they strive to treat these issues primarily outside of the UN.

"Above all, it seems regrettable that disarmament is even an issue," states the ambassador.

According to Korhonen, the UN devotes an unusual amount of time and attention to disarmament, but this world organization's role in disarmament can only

be debatable since the superpowers do not permit it to have a negotiating position.

Propaganda Is Like a Weed

According to Korhonen, in the UN there are many issues which in recent years have become more visible and not always in a positive manner.

"For example, propaganda -- I will now use this word. Without mentioning any names it can be said that the large countries as well as the small countries have always known how to use the UN for promoting their own propaganda and political objectives. There are many positive issues which have been almost suffocated under the weeds of propaganda. This is especially regrettable, and the Nordic countries, for example, have not appreciated this at all. It is, however, apparently an unavoidable circumstance," estimated Korhonen.

However, he notes that there are questions which are purely political, but which the superpowers are simply not able to deal with without the UN.

Near East Complex

"In my opinion one of the best examples is the whole complex of Near East questions with all their various aspects. If the United Nations did not exist -- and it is impossible to cite ifs -- but in any event the UN's role cannot be excluded. It appears that any international dispute that is more significant will be discussed at the UN. This can be of more or less importance -- it can frequently be said even cynically that perhaps its only importance is its propaganda value -- but one cannot be silent about this. It is, however, a kind of political factor which hopefully will be taken into consideration," states Korhonen.

He mentions last year's Falkland/Malvinas dispute as one of the most recent examples of this kind of a crisis. Others are the Afghanistan question, Kampuchea -- or more generally, Southeast Asia, the Near East, the south African question as well as Latin American and Central America where new questions are appearing.

Because of this propaganda, is there not a danger that the UN is creating a distorted picture of the solution of issues and incorrect expectations of the organization's capabilities?

"There is always such a risk. Each incident is, of course, a separate incident; they do not have a common formula for their resolution or measure of success. But one general risk of the UN on which it always stumbles is unfulfilled expectations. Where can one find a balance between realistic expectations and goals? On the one hand, if there are no expectations, the organization could not exist. On the other hand, if its expectations are not fulfilled and if the schedule has been stretched to a completely intolerable point, then this becomes a constant detriment to the organization," stated Korhonen in weighing the issues.

The UN can easily become the subject of a disappointment reaction in such countries as the Nordic countries, notes Korhonen.

"Indeed, this can be easily understood. And this should be remembered in the UN. In my opinion the UN itself -- and almost every country is guilty of this, perhaps the Nordic countries less than the others -- has with its own solutions and decisions created expectations that cannot be fulfilled. In this way it is as if it is digging its own grave," states Korhonen.

"An Ugly Face Is Not the Fault of the Mirror"

According to Korhonen, the Nordic countries have always emphasized that the UN should not use forceful means and majority decisions to adopt resolutions, about which it is known in advance that it is impossible to stand behind them. They become a detriment to the organization. It would be better to recognize that at this time there are no feasible means of dealing with the issue. This is like sailing between Scylla and Charybdis forever," states Korhonen.

The ambassador emphasizes that the UN is above all a permanent negotiating forum. With a few exceptions all the world's governments can maintain a continuous contact there. The UN, is, however, a mirror, which reflects the situation in the world and if the picture is ugly, it is not the fault of the mirror.

"Finland's Position Envidable"

As far as Finland's position is concerned, Korhonen states that in such a diversified country as the United States it is always possible to find people who talk of Finlandization and argue that the decisions of the Finnish government are made elsewhere and are remote-controlled. Among professional people such arguments are not heard according to Korhonen and certainly not from U.S. State Department circles.

On the other hand, such arguments are not presented in the United Nations, states Korhonen. From the point of view of the average member country of the UN Finland's position is in almost all respects envidable, emphasizes the ambassador.

Korhonen states that "rapid and frequent changes in political forms and views are certainly peculiar" to the United States.

"And if it is customary -- or if relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are strained -- then all issues concerning Europe are easily treated from this point of view. Thus recognition of Finland's real position is quite difficult since it does not seem to fit into this kind of a scheme," states the ambassador.

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CSO: 3617/5

SOVIETS SAID TO BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON 'ZONE'

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 15 Sep 83 p 12

[Article: "USSR Ready for Concessions in Kuola Peninsula and Murmansk"]

[Text] Helsinki--Soviet experts have stated that the Soviet Union could offer unilateral concessions in the areas of the Kuola [Kol'skiy] Peninsula, Murmansk, and the Baltic Sea in negotiating a nuclear-free Nordic zone. This statement was made on Wednesday in Helsinki by Doctor Ilmari Susiluoto, who participated in the world meeting of the international Pugwash movement of scientists recently held in Venice.

In official statements to date the Soviet Union has declared only that it would be prepared "to discuss the question of certain essential actions in its own area bordering the zone". The Kuola Peninsula or Murmansk is not officially included in such an area, the Baltic Sea, however, is.

The Soviet Union's official position was presented last by Chairman Yuri Andropov in June. At that time he spoke at a dinner given in honor of visiting President Mauno Koivisto.

Scientists belonging to the Pugwash movement are private citizens, but their views carry considerable significance and weight.

10576

CSO: 3617/5

PASOK FOREIGN POLICY SEEN RESPONSIBLE, INDEPENDENT

Athens ELEVTHERTYPIA in Greek 15 Sep 83 p 4

[Text] It is difficult for one to follow the "sequitur" of the political indictment launched every so often by the New Democracy leadership against the government as regards its relations with the EEC. For months now they have been charging that, contrary to PASOK's pre-electoral words, it has become...a harmless little lamb vis-a-vis the Community. Now they are reprimanding it for dynamiting the Community. Which of the two is happening?

In reality, the government of Andreas G. Papandreou is effectively implementing its own policy, an independent policy, as it had promised to the Greek people. It is natural for this policy not to be pleasing to either Margaret Thatcher's government or the alliance of the "democrats" Kohl, Genscher and Strauss who turn Turkish patriots over to Evren for slaughter.

The fact that Greece is blockading cold-war acts by making use of the right to veto at precisely the moment it presides over the Community is certainly "heavy" for the European Right. However, it is true that it would exercise this right whether it was holding the presidency or not--as it exercised it when European conservatism promoted a resolution for measures against Poland, and Greece was not holding the presidency then.

For what reason would our country change its stance vis-a-vis whatever relates to cold-war systematizations since it is holding the EEC presidency? How would it be possible to repudiate from a stronger position that which it achieved as a simple member--namely, the prevention of the European Community's involvement in elevations of the two superpowers' permanent confrontation?

For the government and movement of Andreas G. Papandreou, strengthening the EEC entails strengthening its independence and not enlisting it in the expediencies of one of the two superpowers. And this theorem is absolutely consistent with what PASOK has projected from the beginning as a desirable future for the Community: a Europe of the people.

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CSO: 3521/3

PASOK'S 'MULTIDIMENSIONAL' POLICY SEEN FAVORING ONLY SOVIETS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25-26 Sep 83 p 5

[Article by K. Tsalaglou]

[Excerpts] More perhaps than many other alterations, that which informs us very persuasively about essential changes in our national affairs, after PASOK's rise to power, is what happened with the Soviets' shooting down of the South Korean airplane. This criminal act was "thrust" into our political life with discords and an acrimony which would be justified only by a disputed handling of a critical national problem. Why, I wonder? Why this storm of reactions, both domestically and among the western governments, over the Greek stance? Did the government not have the right, really, to disagree with the western allies or our economic partners, with what might be their appraisal of the event, with what "punishment" they might prejudice should be imposed on the guilty?

Do the commitments of allies or partners impose such constraints, such a forfeiture of national initiatives? The circumspect answer to this question not only solves the problem of commitments by allies and partners; it allows one to understand, without gaps in logic, the essential content of the "change" in our national affairs, which has been consummated so far by our government, and to explain why this "change" is leading to the gravest turbulence in the country's foreign relations--threatening, in fact, the imposition of sanctions.

The Greek Government did not make use of its right to veto in the EEC Council of Ministers in order to use force in the investigation for formulation of a communique by the "ten" about Soviet responsibilities in the death of the South Korean airplane passengers, influenced by its own "not guilty" opinions. In reality, it prohibited the Community from having an official opinion on the issue! This, of course, is contrary not only to the spirit of a unified political appearance which the EEC members are trying to consolidate, but also to the same expediency which inspired the system of unanimity for certain political decisions, of which Io. Kharalambopoulos has made use.

Second, Mr. Papandreou's government did not demonstrate that it was prompted to its action by different information on the true responsibilities for the tragic incident. Moscow itself has been unable to offer, even up to now, any credible explanation for the reasons which dictated to any Russians, civilian or military, the decision to destroy the airplane. Thus there was nothing left to explain the Greek side's behavior but its desire for Moscow's political and ideologic adversaries not to exploit the event.

A motive for the Greek stance is the desire of A. Papandreou's government for the imperialists not to gain "points" in the field of a "moral" confrontation with socialism. Consequently, for reasons not difficult to list, the PASOK government, while a member of the defensive, economic and political groups of one "world," is working for the moral victory of the rival "world"! This is the essential change which has come about in our national affairs under Mr. Papandreou's government, which explains why Mr. Kharalambopoulos' "veto" assumed such dimensions within Greece and internationally, and which obliges an inquiry into the broader repercussions from continuation of such a two-headed tactic.

The government, of course, is citing as justification for its behavior on the airplane issue its desire for acrimony in relations between the two "camps" and intensification of the cold-war climate to be avoided, even if with a war of words. This assertion is not believable. But, even if it were, the only thing it achieves is to strengthen the position that, in the ideologic war between East and West, Mr. Papandreou's government sides with the East. It would not be so if Moscow abstained from exploiting propagandistically its adversary's mistakes. Not only does it not abstain, on the contrary, it is invincible in guiding violent reactions, reactions which do not favor, naturally, an improvement in relations between East and West, which do not dissolve the cold-war clouds. The Greek "Left," including PASOK, has not been absent in any of these propagandistic reactions. This means that PASOK, along with the dogmatic Left, thinks that rightness is always on Moscow's side, and for this reason, that its attacks against the capitalist adversary serve, and do not undermine, world peace! Hence, what undermines peace--the "historically" true danger--is the western world. The world with which, despite all these, it continues to maintain defensive, political, economic, cultural and every other kind of relations as its organic member, not as a Greece free from conventional commitments, a third party!

Where is this behavior leading? How long can it be continued without its consequences being catastrophic for our country?

The most common explanation for the government's pro-Soviet, anti-western expression is its supposed aspiration to "treat gently" the dogmatic KKE so it will not make life difficult for it with strikes and similar actions. This explanation originates from an inaccuracy: the inaccuracy that KKE is free to exercise a different policy from that which Moscow allows it to exercise, in which it is not excluded from coming into conflict with the expediencies of the Kremlin's international policy. The dogmatic KKE neither enjoys such generosities, nor considers that it can ever enjoy them without instantly losing Soviet support. Experience has taught it, conversely, that where communist parties, influenced by "national interests," come into conflict with the local government supported by Moscow, the protected government is left free, with Moscow's approval, to break up the disobedient parties however it prefers, even by executing their leading cadres. The examples are abundant in the neighboring Middle Eastern countries, and in those of Latin America.

When the Papandreou government has reestablished direct lines of communication with the Soviet Government to the degree that it secures from Soviet propaganda even congratulations for the signing of the U.S. bases agreement, it has absolutely no need of gestures of appeasement to Mr. Florakis' party. But even if the direct relations of the co-traveler government with the Kremlin on international problems

were interrupted, the KKE would be unable to do anything decisive against the PASOK government. Unemployment, and the legislative activity of Mr. Koutsogiorgas and PASOK's other leading cadres, inspired by the pro-labor legislations of regimes which do not allow excessive freedom of movement to citizens, is enough to weaken the communists' "dynamic" initiatives.

In addition, the section of "hardline" Marxists which acts at the high levels of PASOK and which appears to be imposing its own line so far, is composed of "Marxists" who are not about to leave Mr. Papandreou's "movement" to find shelter in the dogmatic KKE because the "movement" is perhaps not as "socialistic" as they would wish. And they are not going to leave because what led them under Mr. Papandreou is not "his charismatic personality," but their conviction that if a socialist regime were ever going to be established in the country, it would be unable to happen with KKE. The dogmatic KKE is unable--according to their very correct opinion--to take hold of power with parliamentary procedures. With these procedures, the socialist hopes can be "carried" only by a faction with a "credo" indefinite enough to collect the most possible non-communist votes. A more ideal faction than that of Mr. Papandreou--which believes that the family in power will be maintained for at least half a century if it is supported by Moscow, as the "Right" remained in power with the support of the West--could not be found at this time. Nor is the government making intense and constant pro-Soviet openings in order to hold the movement's "hardline Marxist" cadres and adherents. It must be accepted without reservations, that these openings are inspired by the ambition of PASOK leading circles to establish a socialist regime in Greece--an ambition which could not possibly be promoted without Soviet assistance.

Thus we arrived at something truly unprecedented for modern political events, a regime which is two-headed in the mechanisms and inclinations which operate to guide the current national activity and to shape its future! The responsible government, fully participating in the effective activity of the organization of one world, the West, and drawing from it nearly all its financial resources and means of "support" for national sovereignty, is cooperating with the rival world to destroy the one to which it belongs! It is very natural that the organizations in which the country participates are unable to pass by such screaming inconsistencies when their continuance threatens to create precedents which will destroy them.

The vehemence of their reactions is absolutely understandable. Moscow reacted with invasions by its army into the territory of "brother" socialist countries every time the government in one of these countries developed initiatives not approved by the Soviet Communist Party. Consequently, this does not concern a frenzy over the collapse of the worldwide Right, as the various pro-government, pro-Soviet printed matter inform. It concerns government actions of countries which want to force Mr. Papandreou's government to clarify whether it wishes to cooperate with them or not. If it does not want to, no one would stop it from leaving the EEC or NATO.

But can it leave? Does the PASOK government have the power to transport the country from the "other side of the mountain?" To make it a member of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON? With the approval of whom--since the overwhelming majority of Greek people certainly do not wish it--is such a bold act able to be attempted? But if the group of "hardline Marxists" in PASOK does not aim so far, does it believe it can

logically expect that the present hermaphroditic regime will be continued for very long! When there is no sign at all of a multidimensional policy. Because if the "multidimensional" policy is not friendly in every direction, it is empty talk. From the side of EEC, at least, we must not expect friendly demonstrations, when the inclination for positive cooperation with the Greek side is stopped every time an issue connected to the USSR's interests is about to be dealt with. The "multidimensionality" of the present foreign policy is composed of a bunch of hostile feelings toward our country due to the intense mistrust produced by the provocative inconsistency in our foreign relations.

An unpleasant but true conclusion: The national political life is being influenced more and more by the antagonism of the two worlds, and the field of explosion of international oppositions is occurring on a wider and wider range. Nothing worse could happen to us. Those who dream of invasions and seizures of territory or "conveniences" are waiting for such opportunities to make their dreams reality!

9247

OSO: 3321/4

AVEROF SEEN USING NEW CADRES AGAINST ND CHALLENGERS

'New' Talent Sought

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 11 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by Mikh. Dimitriou]

[Text] New Democracy President Evangleos Averof has decided to use certain new deputies and party cadres in order to confront the challenges--from many diverse sides--to his position as leader.

Mr. Averof had made these intentions of his known recently to his close colleagues; after the attack by "hardline factors" from the Right it is expected that he will succeed in implementing them.

It is clear that the ND president has begun to speculate how much the tactic of polarization and division is strengthening the chances, on the one hand, of the party achieving a recovery in the public opinion, so as to justify ambitions of re-acquiring power, and, on the other, of securing his own position in the party leadership. For this reason, Mr. Averof has recommended to Executive Committee meetings the quest for a "centipetal rightist course" and the "controlled renewal" of the party, after expressions of allegiance by the "dauphins." Thus, Mr. Averof and his colleagues--without great enthusiasm--had recently reestablished relations with the "Andrianopoulos-Kondogianopoulos" twins and with Milt. Evert and discussed the development in both the Chamber and party activities of young, newly-elected deputies like G. Souflias, P. Sarlis, St. Dimas, K. Sapsalis, An. Papaliouras, G. Misailidis, Nik. Anastasopoulos, K. Giatrakos, Them. Sofoulis, Ap. Kratasis and Froso Spendzari.

The ballot for the Euroelections was set by Mr. Averof as a leading point for this "controlled renewal"; there are thoughts of placing in high positions on it Khariton Keryzis, Evth. Khristodoulou, Pan. Lambrias, Georgios Drakos, Stratis Stratigis, Dimitris Sioufas, Fanni Palli-Petralia and G. Dalakouras.

At the same time, Mr. Averof reportedly has expressed his intention to control both the "power politics" of ONNED [Youth Organization of New Democracy] cadres and its head, Andonis Samaras, and their "selective rapprochements" with extreme-right elements. Also, it is reportedly Mr. Averof's intention to develop and promote many party cadres who are young and have a new-right direction, such as Pan. Diamandakos,

Alex. Lambrouzos, Zaf. Khatzidimitriou, Vasilis Manginas, D. Bekhrakis, Ag. Moskhonas, Sofia Vergi, Pan. Karadondis, etc. These intentions of Mr. Averof--unrelated to the reactions of his conservative circle and their oscillations and persuasiveness on public opinion--appear to have been strengthened after the attempt to challenge provoked recently by factors from the Right's socioeconomic regime.

The targets of this campaign, which ranged from dictating "tough political behavior" vis-a-vis the government to undermining and destroying Kon. Karamanlis and the institutions, are noted characteristically in a leading article in the PASOK party newspaper EKORMISI. According to the article, the danger from the plans of these circles must not be underestimated; their goal is for an extreme-right piece to "jump out" of ND, a piece which will coalesce whatever is extreme-right, junrist and fascist, to feed itself like a malignant tumor on the national body.

Background for Challengers' Attack

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 11 Sep 83 p 11

[Article by Mih. Dimitriou]

[Excerpts] The challenging of Evangelos Averof by hardline factors from the Right (interjected in this orchestration are certain excerpts from the article by the publisher of AKROPOLIS, G. Levidis, on 4 September) have caused rollings and pitchings, but also interesting inner-party developments.

It appears strange at first view, but it is a fact that the recent conflict within the heart of the Right in the end strengthened (although it is unknown for how long) Evangelos Averof's position as leader.

The ND president became the pole of coalition and a common point of reference for many reasons.

This is almost self-evident, as long as shots were fired from the wings which reached the position of the president of the republic, and ambitions were systematized at the expense of the party "dauphins," leading cadres and deputies.

Nevertheless, the most important political fact for ND's future inner-party developments--as long as Mr. Averof remains a "strong pole of coalition"--is the contents of his answer and counterattack last Tuesday, 6 September, from Metsovon. For the first time, Mr. Averof not only did not hesitate to "annoy" writers friendly to him, he also proceeded to an open counterattack, with accusations about both the motives and "all that is hidden behind the screen."

Moreover, Mr. Averof--as will be analyzed further on--aligns himself against the "political acrimony" which is demanded by the prompters from the Right and expresses his attachment to a "mild, moderate, centrist and progressive policy."

According to the interpretation of circles at 18 Rigillis street, hidden behind the recent challenging of Mr. Averof is an alliance of "old-rightist" elements--including those nostalgic for royalty, people from the seven-year dictatorship and extreme rightists--and it reportedly maintains contact with the circle of the shipowner and hotel magnate Giannis Theodorakopoulos and business magnate Giannis Latsis.

It is clear that Mr. Averof's "centrist speculations" coincided with the attacks undertaken by the "old rightist" circles and their alliance. Thus, this attack, with the reactions and coalitions it created, strengthened the position of Mr. Averof who decided (feeling strong enough recently "both upwards and downwards") to counterattack.

The strengthening of Mr. Averof's position is owing to different reasons and expediencies. Precisely for this reason, coalescing at present around Mr. Averof are aides and deputies who--in all other respects--acknowledge that "there is a problem of leadership in the party," but are putting off confronting it until later and connect this confrontation with their own ambitions and power politics.

Nevertheless, the whole subject of the "counterattack" by the old-rightist circles and the financial "consortium" which reportedly is concealed has created speculations among the various ND factions.

The young deputies with a centrist origin and "new-right" placement estimate that financial circles want to dictate their wishes to the party and control it absolutely later.

Mr. Averof's circle believes that the purpose of these pressures is to incorporate in the party the extreme and junist Right, as analogous oblique intentions had happened before to close colleagues of the ND president.

Other colleagues of Mr. Averof believe that "the whole conspiracy" is only a drop, behind which are intentions to strengthen Kon. Mitsotakis' leadership ambitions.

The circle of Mr. Boutos (who is in the United States) and Miltiadis Evert think that the chief, but unacknowledged, target of the attack is the person and political advice of the party's founder, President of the Republic Karamanlis.

4. Stefanopoulos' circle reportedly believes that it is all about an effort for change not only in the people, but also in the political line, by "old brains, tickle and pigoted."

The circle of "pro-Rallis" deputies interpret that it is an "attack by factors whom Averof went along with up to now and who do not need him at present."

It appears that Mr. Averof is now adopting basic elements from the "pro-Rallis" factors' speculation, according to the testimonies of his colleagues with whom he talked after his return from Metsovon.

Mr. Averof reportedly perceives that the tactic of polarization and division not only shrinks every hope for an ND recovery, it also undermines his own position as leader.

Although the "hardliners" continue to remain loyal as deputies, as factors of the right they are firing against Averof--until yesterday their chosen one--because they believe "someone else younger and more dynamic" could better implement the tactic of confrontation toward the government and PASOK.

Thus, the tactic of "revanche" to which Mr. Averof has yielded several times so far is becoming a "boomerang" for him.

As IO VIMA has repeatedly analyzed, this tactic, while it does not echo the real intentions of ND's peaceable popular base, is blessed--and there is an effort to impose it in ND--by a part of the politicosocial and economic regime which has been supplanted in recent years, particularly after the 1981 elections.

This regime, which does not care about modernizing either ND's ideologic and political identity or its behavior, is looking for a person and controlled political vehicle which will implement the "confrontation with the Marxist PASOK." Until then, the hour of the dynamic collision will have to be facilitated with the unity of all the household nationalists, revival of the civil-war climate, and systematic deterioration of the government, primarily at the level of the credibility of its cadres and prime minister.

Precisely for this reason, it is extending its attack against the policy of a "mild climate" and against the person of the president of the republic and it is engaging in a show of force with the challenging of Evangelos Averof's position as leader.

However much Mr. Averof is paying the penalties for his political behavior so far, it is obvious that any compulsory withdrawal from the party at present has a wider meaning than "a change in the guard," which it would have under other conditions and at another time.

To a great degree, Mr. Averof's ability to maintain his position (regardless of whether he loses it later under other conditions) is connected to the problem of how much the crisis in the Rightist faction will be turned into a first victory for those factors who are attempting a crisis in the institutions.

The writer believes that there are many chances of Mr. Averof surpassing--with the assistance of the coalitions which have been created--the challenging of the leadership, and of the fermentations and systematizations against him "freezing" yet again (and probably for a definite number of months).



"What's this, after all what makes you think they will eat me?" [Cartoon by Nikos Sidiropoulos]

1047
3021/3

CYPRIOT ISSUE SEEN REACHING CRITICAL STAGE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Sep 83 p 5

[Text] For almost a third of the century, the Cypriot issue has not been absent even one day from the newspaper columns; often it has occupied their front pages and half a score of proposals to solve it have been expressed. They all had a common characteristic: Each one was worse than the previous one for the Greek side. In this period, enthusiasm repeatedly gave way to disappointment, sacrifice walked hand in hand with destruction and it all ended in the tragic July 1974, which is essentially continuing....

Let us leave it to history to sort out the past when its time comes. Let us look at current things.

If there is a period in which absolute harmony on the Cypriot issue was absolutely necessary, it is today, vis-a-vis the De Cuellar initiative.

Many believe that the De Cuellar initiative is the last opportunity offered for Cyprus to emerge from the manifoldly dangerous morass in which it has been found since July 1974. They propound the following arguments in support of this:

First of all, it is an initiative which has the acknowledged approval of the two superpowers and all the others. This is the first time that has happened since the Cypriot issue was created and, without a doubt, it differentiates De Cuellar's initiative from all those which have preceded.

Second, the content of the De Cuellar initiative is exceptionally realistic, as it has shortened the distances between the two sides' positions, thus creating the starting points for contacts to begin.

But, aside from these, who can overlook the fact that the one-hundred and eleven months of Turkish occupation are tending to develop into an accomplished fact for two-fifths of the island? Furthermore, who can overlook the fact that the geopolitical importance of Turkey appears strengthened at present?

But the supporters of the De Cuellar initiative add other arguments on behalf of it: It was revealed twenty days earlier than expected, at precisely the moment Turkish threats for a dynamic solution had peaked. Turkey, exploiting its internationally strengthened position, is looking for solutions in the whole spectrum of its relations with our country (on 21 September it raised the Aegean issue).

It would be very absurd for one to maintain that these arguments are not powerful. And it would require a large departure from reality, much diplomatic short-sightedness, and a great discord with logic to disain the UN secretary general's initiative. As happened with all the former proposals.

Of course, no one overlooks the fact that absolute acceptance of an initiative, on an issue which has been constantly in the forefront for almost three decades (let us leave former times) is not a simple matter. Accepting the responsibilities before history, and on issues so national and so discussed as the Cypriot issue, is an even more difficult matter.

In fact, for the Greek Government the issue presents additional difficulties: A prisoner of its pre-electoral sloganizing which placed an inviolable limit on the start of talks and departure of Turkish troops, and bound by the promises of freedom given by Mr. Papandreou during his visit to Cyprus, it probably did not manage to immediately grasp the significance of the De Cuellar initiative.

Of course, all these are not outside the frameworks of Greek reality. With its measures, they are both logical and excusable.

And it would be a mistake to not exploit the UN secretary general's initiative which has the approval of the two superpowers and all the others, something which is happening for the first time in the history of the Cypriot issue, as we reported.

Whoever who bear the responsibility for the decisions not overlook the fact that such a mistake would remove from Ankara and Denktash every impediment to the solution which they threaten. And surely, in such a case, Mr. Kyprianou's phrase, that "only the enemies of Cyprus will be happy," would have a real application.

Since the time of Aristotle, no one has succeeded in felling the definition of politics as the art of the attainable. Perhaps the content of the De Cuellar initiative expresses precisely this attainability at this time.

This question must answer all those who at this time have the responsibility in Nicosia and Athens. And on the basis of the answer, let them define their position vis-a-vis Cyprus and history and their history.

YAA7

Ref: 3521/3

EAST, WEST BOTH BLAMED FOR KOREAN JET DISASTER

Athens ANDI in Greek No 241, 16 Sep 83 p 11

[Article by Ar. Psaltis]

[Text] It is not an exaggeration to maintain that the first act of the third world war has been played out somewhere between Sakhalin and the northern shores of Japan. The 269 people who were torn to pieces in the air are but the presumption of the same sudden and senseless death which awaits two-thirds of humanity in the next act of a similar event on a greater scale.

And, as for assigning responsibilities, we do not hesitate to say that, whatever versions one accepts, the main responsibility for this incredible escalation and appalling crime is born by the Soviet Union, not the United States.

Let us make ourselves clearer, relying on the only weapon of simple people, which is common logic. The Soviets have already admitted (after a long silence) that they shot down the airplane which they considered a spy plane. But even if it was not spying, the Russians complete, we would have shot it down because it violated our "sacred" borders.

Let us consider as the issue of spying is becoming quieter. The Soviets know well that no important, or even secondary, spying activity could be conducted by any airplane. Because they know well that the last inch of Soviet earth is being photographed by U.S. spy satellites on a 24-hour basis and that consequently there was no particular need for photographing from any airplane. In fact, this mutual photographing is so reliable that the SALT talks are based on the absolute understanding and mutual knowledge of the achievements of the "other" side.

The Soviets also know that gigantic electronic surveillance networks, with American substations up to and on Chinese soil, follow every military or political conversation with utmost detail. As they also know the United States' other sources of information, so that the flight of an airplane above their strategic areas has only a symbolic significance, not a real one.

From another side, the argument that there was confusion between the jumbo jet and another similar U.S. spy plane can only be directed to idiots. If eight Soviet pilots were unable to discern the difference between a jumbo jet and a military airplane, then we are really in danger of other worse things.

It is exceedingly simple for us to accept that the Soviets shot down the jumbo jet simply to affirm the indisputable sovereignty of their national territory, directing a message of strength to those who are likely to misinterpret their otherwise pacifist policy.

Now farther, let us suppose that the Americans did attempt a spy mission with the jumbo jet. (That is, the pilot would take pictures of Sakhalin from the window with a "Leica.") This means that they persuaded at least five people (the number in a jumbo jet who know its exact route at every moment) to go on a suicide mission. Furthermore, the jumbo jet pilots were such fanatical spies that they ignored the exhortations to land (which there surely were), the tracers (which in any case were fired) and preferred to die rather than be captured.

Nevertheless this story does not "stick." But something else fits: That some U.S. circles, who want the cold war to be intensified and escalated, fearing some eventual progress towards detente, "set up" the story by electronically misguiding the jumbo jet pilot and inflicting on him the radio's silence or deflection (two things absolutely possible with the modern means of electronic warfare).

If this hypothetical scenario "stands up," these circles correctly calculated its natural conclusion: namely, that the Soviet military caste, sunk in its own polemic hysteria would add the "final solution," would shoot down the jumbo jet, thus giving a wonderful card to Reagan's aggressiveness. As happened.

Even this interpretation does not exempt the Soviets from the brutality and unbelievable political myopia of their tactic. Because if they are ensnared so simply by a civilian airplane, then how will they protect themselves from a more complex operation of international political provocation?

We are really living on the edge of the most menacing abyss, as it seems that the most horrible fears are daily becoming realities. The fate of the world is hanging on some Reagan people or some Ogarkov generals, people whose reflexes are organized at the level of primitives in the contest for food and living space.

If we assume, however, that capitalism has such a logic embodied within it, when did socialism also acquire it?

1287

3521/3

PUBLIC POLLED ON GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC RESULTS

Poll Results

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16 Sep 83 pp 2-5

[Text] Judging from the results of a 3-day poll carried out by Marktest for O JORNAL last week, almost half of the Portuguese electorate has a "bad" or "very bad" opinion of the present government's performance while the other half "sees" it as being at least "average." On the other hand, only 7 percent of the population has a "good" or "very good" image of the administration.

Table 1

(vertical percentages)

How the Electorate "Sees" the Government's Performance
(opinion according to 25 April 1983 vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
Very good	1	--	3	--	--	--	3
Good	6	10	9	--	--	5	3
Average	41	55	55	5	29	37	44
Bad	31	23	17	53	54	38	30
Very bad	15	10	5	38	18	15	14
Does not know/ does not respond	5	2	11	3	--	10	4
Other responses	1	--	--	2	--	--	3

[PS--Socialist Party, PSD--Social Democratic Party, APU--United People's Alliance, CDS--Social Democratic Center Party]

Table 2

(vertical percentages)

Compared with the previous government, the present one is...?
(Opinions according to 25 April 1983 election vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
...much better	2	4	1	--	--	2	3
...better	23	40	25	6	--	14	24
...the same	47	40	43	69	32	54	44
...worse	18	8	20	17	64	17	20
...much worse	3	4	3	6	4	1	4
does not know/ does not respond	6	4	3	2	--	12	5

Table 3

(vertical percentages)

How long is the current government going to last?
(Opinions according to 25 April 1983 election vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
n sample	23	12	17	49	18	31	22
1 year	20	17	16	26	32	21	20
1 1/2 years	6	9	4	3	7	3	6
2 years	8	13	11	3	--	4	6
longer	26	38	34	6	21	20	22
does not know/ does not respond	17	11	18	13	22	21	24

According to the results of this poll which surveyed 500 adults (18 years and over) in 5 cities in continental Portugal, 41 percent of those polled consider the PS/PSD government's performance to be "average" while 46 percent express a negative opinion of it. For 31 percent of the sample, the government's image is "bad" and 15 percent express an even less favorable opinion since they view the present administration's performance as being "very bad."

The government does have some more or less enthusiastic supporters. However, only 1 percent of the electorate considers its performance to be "very good" while 6 percent view it as being "good." All in all, only 7 percent of the sample openly support the current administration's image.

Of course, the government's negative image is stronger among those who voted for the opposition parties. According to the results of this poll, 91 percent of those who voted for APU and 72 percent of those who voted for the CDS express a "bad" and "very bad" opinion of the government.

However, even among those who voted for the parties that make up the government coalition, the administration's image does not get more than an "average" rating. This is the opinion shared by 55 percent of PS and PSD voters.

According to the opinions expressed by the sample surveyed by the poll, only 3 percent of the PSD electorate reportedly viewed the administration's performance favorably. Likewise, 10 percent of the PS electorate and 9 percent of the PSD voters reportedly still had a good opinion of the government's performance.

The results of the poll indicate a greater amount of pessimism among women voters: while 45 percent of the men consider the government's performance to be "bad" or "very bad," 48 percent of the women express this opinion. Moreover, while 45 percent of the male electorate say the government's performance is "average," only 37 percent of the women express the same benevolence.

When broken down into age groups, the one that is most critical of the government consists of people between the ages of 30 and 44. Fifty percent of the people in this age group find the work done by the government team headed by Mario Soares and Mota Pinto deserves a "bad" or "very bad" rating. At the same time, the most benevolent group toward the government appears to be made up of people between the age of 18 and 29. The percentage of those who give the administration an "average" grade (46 percent) and those who have a negative opinion (47 percent) is almost the same.

In geographic terms, Setubal is the most critical city: 69 percent of the voters surveyed rate the government's performance as "bad" or "very bad" as opposed to 52 percent of Porto's residents, 37 percent of the residents of Lisbon or Faro, and 35 percent of the inhabitants of Viseu.

When asked to compare the present government with the previous one, 47 percent of those polled considered them to be the "same." As a matter of fact, this was the opinion expressed by the majority of those who voted for the PS, PSD, or the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] last April. At the same time, CDS voters were overwhelmingly inclined (64 percent) toward the idea that the Soares administration is "worse" than the Balsemao led cabinet. In addition, 4 percent of the centrist voters said they considered this government to be "much worse" than the previous one.

In any event, excluding those who believe both governments are the "same," the percentage of those who believe this administration is "better" (23 percent) is greater than those who believe it is "worse" (18 percent).

As for the current government's life expectancy, a relative majority of the electorate (34 percent) represented by the sample acknowledges the administration will remain in office for at least 2 years while 23 percent feel the Soares and Mota Pinto team will only last 6 months, and 20 percent limit its duration to 1 year.

Moreover, if we add all those who say the government will last at least 1 year, we see that 60 percent of the sample express this view. Twenty-six percent say it will last 1 year, 6 percent are inclined toward 18 months, 8 percent toward 2 years and 26 percent say it will last longer than 2 years.

Specialists Govern as Though They Were the PSD

If the electorate's overall opinion of the government can be classified as somewhat unenthusiastic--keeping in mind, above all, that the government has not yet been in office for 4 months (theoretically a period of expectations)--the individual responses allow us to understand the reasons for this disenchantment.

Table 4

(vertical percentages)

Did the government's "100 measures" materialize?
(Opinions according to 25 April 1983 election vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
None/almost none	49	44	61	51	57	46	43
All/almost all	13	23	11	2	--	6	18
Government did the opposite of what it promised	19	15	13	38	21	23	13
Does not know/ does not respond	16	15	11	7	18	22	20
Other responses	3	3	4	2	4	3	6

First of all, the PS raised major pre-election expectations (see Table 4) when it announced its "100 measures for the first 100 days." Now that the 100 days have passed, almost 50 percent of the people surveyed think the "100 measures" remained on paper. This result becomes that much more significant when it encompasses 44 percent of the sample who said they voted for the PS in April. It all becomes worse when we read that 61 percent of those who claim to have voted for the PSD also think that, up till now, the government has applied practically none of the 100 measures.

At the political level, these results reveal a dangerous tendency to frustrate the expectations of the PS/PSD electoral base, which represents the support of the coalition now in office.

If we add the 19 percent of the sample who think the government is doing the exact opposite of what it promised (APU voters contributed heavily to this percentage) to the 49 percent who believe the 100 measures were not put in effect, we have 68 percent of those polled believing the government is acting contrary to its promises.

Also, one cannot but notice that only 11 percent of the PSD electorate believe the measures were or are being applied. This provides a good measure of the weak opinion PSD voters have of the government which is made up in part by the party they voted for. Worse yet, the percentage of unsatisfied people rises to the highest level among PSD voters--61 percent, as opposed to 57 percent among CDS supporters and 51 percent among APU supporters.

The results we glean from this survey also allow us to reach other interesting conclusions, particularly when these are brought together with the results contained in the following table. The aim of this table was to gauge the credibility and acceptance of the measures taken so far by the government.

Table 5

(vertical percentages)

The austerity measures adopted by the government...
(Opinions according to 25 April 1983 election vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
...were inevitable	29	44	39	3	25	18	30
...are a solution for the future	15	19	28	3	14	6	16
...only serve to worsen people's lives	40	23	32	58	57	54	40
...are a result of the AD's bad policies	14	13	1	35	4	16	11
...does not know/does not respond or other response	2	1	1	1	--	6	3

The alternative responses provided to those being surveyed allowed for significant variation in the level of responses. These alternatives also include one paragraph excusing the current government. All in all, 40 percent of those polled (see Table 5) consider that the measures adopted by the government worsened the lives of the people. This is, of course, the overwhelming feeling among the opposition (APU and CDS). It is also significant that 23 percent of those who voted for the PS and 32 percent of those who voted for the PSD share this rather radical opinion. Also, while 29 percent of those polled believe such measures were inevitable and 14 percent hold the AD [Democratic Alliance] responsible for them, it is significant that only 15 percent think such measures are, in fact, a way of solving the problems. It is curious that on this point PSD voters are more positive than PS voters. This may be related to the perception each bloc has regarding the government's power and programmatic center.

In fact, while 54 percent of those questioned believe the PS "makes the decisions" in the government (see Table 6), the figures show that a majority believes the administration's actions are closer to the PSD program and a minority believes the cabinet is following the tenets of the socialist program (see Table 7).

Table 6

(vertical percentages)

Does the PS or the PSD have more power in the government?
(Opinions according to 25 April 1983 election vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
PS	54	68	59	35	53	47	48
PSD	16	9	19	26	11	17	18
Same	25	19	20	36	32	27	26
Does not know/ does not respond	5	4	2	3	4	9	8

Table 7

(vertical percentages)

Are the government's actions closer to the PS or PSD program?
(Opinions according to 25 April 1983 election vote)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Does not indicate</u>	<u>Did not vote</u>
PS	27	35	37	10	54	16	24
PSD	35	36	31	59	7	32	29
Same	26	21	23	26	32	32	30
Does not know/ does not respond	12	8	9	5	7	20	17

Let us analyze these two points in succession. The fact that the PS "makes the decisions" in the government is accepted and recognized even by 59 percent of those who claim to have voted for the PSD. Even among APU supporters, 35 percent believe the socialists hold the government's political reins. Only 16 percent of those polled believe the PSD controls the government. However, this is lower than the 25 percent who think both coalition parties share the same amount of power.

The picture changes completely when we try to determine the government's ideological/programmatic axis. Not even the socialist electorate has any illusions on this point (see Table 7); 36 percent of them think the axis falls on the PSD program while 35 percent believe it falls on the socialist program. Among PSD supporters, 37 percent believe the axis falls on the PS while 31 percent believe it falls on their own program. As expected, while a large majority of the APU supporters surveyed thinks the government is "orange," the reverse is true among CDS supporters. This is not astonishing if we keep in mind the respective positions of the two groups in the political spectrum. If we were to combine the results of both tables, we could summarize, grosso modo, the lesson they teach: the PS leads the government on the basis of a social democratic policy which is close to the PSD program.

The Two Warts Dismissible From the Nationalized Firms

If certain measures that have been discussed for a long time are applied by this government, a large majority of Portuguese will be squarely against them.

Out of a package of five foreseeable unpopular measures submitted to the sample, only two got a favorable majority: raising rents and taxing second homes. The results are interesting, particularly as a measure of how sensitive the different electorates are to the proposed measures.

Thus, the tax on second homes gets a favorable rating of 59 percent. However, the more interesting figure here seems to be the 38 percent against this measure. What does it mean? Does it [represent] the number of Portuguese who have two homes or, at least, those who would like to have them? The high percentage of APU voters who do not agree (36 percent as opposed to 25 percent among PS voters) is even more striking. Furthermore, it seems clear that the government will have the solid support of the PS (74 percent), APU (62 percent), and PSD (59 percent) electorates on this matter. Out of the five measures considered, this is the only one to get the support of the majority of APU voters.

The APU/PS convergence on the bank credit measure is curious: 85 percent of APU voters are against it and they share the company of 82 percent of the PS's electorate.

When we arrive at questions that may affect everyone regardless of his ideological affiliation the convergence is then complete. If the government were to consider firing people from the nationalized firms, it would face the opposition of all sectors--75 percent of those surveyed opposed the measure. Nineteen four percent of APU's electorate and 84 percent of the PS's, followed by 77 percent of the PSD's and 54 percent of the CDS's would oppose it.

As for the temporary lay-off of workers, only CDS voters favor it (30 percent). Unsurprisingly, however, 70 percent of the sample would be against this measure.

It should be noted that 51 percent of the sample favors raising rents. CDS, PSD and PS voters predominantly favor this measure and the APU electorate is against it. The percentage of those disagreeing is, nevertheless, very high (44 percent).

Finally, out of the five measures presented for consideration, the most unpopular one would be to give people from the nationalized enterprises and the one with the most support would be the tax on second homes.

Table 8

(vertical percentages)

Opinion on measures that may be taken.

(According to vote in the 25 April 1983 election)

Measure	Opinion	Total	PS	PSD	APU	CDS	Does not indicate	Did not vote
Cut in second home	Agree	59	74	59	62	21	56	48
	Disagree	38	25	40	36	75	40	48
	does not know/	3	1	1	2	4	4	4
	does not respond							
Raising rents	Agree	51	59	67	27	71	41	47
	Disagree	44	38	29	67	25	23	47
	does not know/	5	3	4	6	4	6	6
	does not respond							
Restricting bank profits	Agree	22	23	29	11	18	14	32
	Disagree	72	71	67	85	82	74	61
	does not know/	6	6	4	4	--	12	7
	does not respond							
Laying-off workers	Agree	24	25	47	3	50	18	17
	Disagree	70	71	50	95	39	74	72
	does not know/	6	4	3	2	11	8	11
	does not respond							
Nationalizing firms	Agree	21	13	39	3	43	23	23
	Disagree	75	84	57	94	54	70	73
	does not know/	4	3	4	3	3	7	4
	does not respond							

A Representative Sample

This Marquest poll was conducted on 5, 6 and 7 September in five district capitals of mainland Portugal. The poll surveyed 500 people taken in equal numbers from Lisbon, Porto, Viseu, Faro and Setubal.

The sample chosen included both males and females 18 years of age and over. The interviews were conducted in the street using the quota method. Sex and age were used as control variables.

Since the sample is not representative of the entire Portuguese electorate, any nationwide projections should be made with due reservations.

In a way, however, the people surveyed by the poll match all the urban center residents that voted in the April 1983 Assembly of the Republic elections. The following indicators bear this out: 421 out of the 500 people in our

sample (i.e. 84.2 percent) voted in the 1993 legislative elections while 15.8 percent did not (15.8 percent). We should recall that 5,626,097 people, representing 74.6 percent of the electorate, voted in that election.

One hundred and forty nine of those surveyed by Marktest said they voted for the PS in the April elections, 75 for the PSD, 66 for APU and 18 for the CDS. One hundred and three did not indicate what party they voted for nor the direction of their vote. Once everything is calculated, we see that 31 percent of the sample voted for the PS, 18 percent preferred the PSD, 16 percent chose APU and 7 percent the CDS while 2 percent voted for other parties and 22 percent did not indicate their preference. The PS had 36.3 percent of the vote in the April 1993 election, while the PSD had 27 percent, APU 18.2 percent and the CDS 12.4 percent.

Table 7

(vertical percentages)

What party did you vote for in the Assembly of the Republic elections?

	Total	Sex		Age			Localities				
		Male	Female	18-29	30-44	45+	Lisbon	Porto	Setúbal	Faro	Viseu
PS	31	40	30	29	43	32	25	41	37	35	39
PSD	18	17	18	10	14	26	28	12	6	15	28
APU	16	17	14	25	13	13	16	9	37	13	5
CDS	7	8	6	5	6	8	7	11	2	6	7
Others	2	2	3	4	3	1	4	3	4	--	2
Don't not indicate	22	16	28	27	21	20	20	24	14	31	19

'Disenchantment' Seen

FRANCO O. JORNAL. In Portuguese 16 Sep 83 p 2

(Text) While it is not possible to obtain an absolutely exact gauge of the population's state of mind vis-a-vis the government, it is true that a public opinion poll such as the one O JORNAL publishes in this edition allows us to know a very close outline of this administration's public image. The results of the survey indisputably show that, at the end of its first 100 days in office, the PS/PSD government is far from being able to claim the same wide popular support that it enjoys in parliament.

It cannot be said that its performance is rejected out of hand. The least that can be said is that it arouses little enthusiasm because it has seemed to be unable to mobilize popular energies to the unpostponable tasks of rebuilding the nation.

All in all, only 7 percent of those surveyed in our poll openly support the government's image while 41 percent consider its performance to be "average" and 47 percent express a negative attitude toward the government. The "100 measures," with which the PS created significant pre-election expectations,

...and so people feel about half of those surveyed because the implementation process has practically ended.

As one can see this is the opinion of just those people who voted for the opposition parties. This opinion is shared by 44 percent of those claiming to have voted for the PS and 61 percent of those who gave the PSD the votes to name it the socialists' coalition partner in this the 13th Portuguese government since 11 April 1974.

The feeling that the government is led by the PS but that it applies the PSD's program (smoothed of any progressive "edges"...) takes shape in light of the results of the poll published above. Not even the Socialist Party electorate has any illusions in this matter. It recognizes the government as being "conservative."

As for the anticipated measures that may jeopardize the people's already low standard of living, there is a great convergence of opposition to the government, particularly when firing or laying off people from the nationalized enterprises is mentioned. There are appreciably fewer negative opinions to increasing taxes on luxury taxes, for example.

The poll reveals the curious and symptomatic tendency that women are more "sensitive" toward a government that is constantly increasing the prices of basic necessities (a real headache for the housewife who was not born with a dollar sign in her mouth...) than men are.

Almost half of the electorate surveyed by a polling firm for O JORNAL seems to share the opinion that this government is projecting the same image of itself as the former discredited (for many reasons) government it succeeded.

It also figures the enormity of the task the government coalition parties have been charged with by the electorate. However, this is merely one more reason to urge the authorities to do everything to halt the disenchantment (which can be dangerous to democracy itself) of millions of Portuguese.

Even as we urge of doing everything, we also want to include that it is absolutely necessary for them to change many of their actions and style so as to give citizens a serious, open, and disinterested image of public service which is most rare in democracy.

Finally, it should be pointed out that this poll was carried out by the same nonpolitical firm that did the one we published in February. The polling firm used similar samples and the same methods in this poll as in the last.

According to the February poll, and given the options then available, a majority of the Portuguese by far preferred Mario Soares for prime minister and a PS/PSD coalition. The subsequent elections confirmed these results as well as others. We stress this point now because there are always those people who believe in polls and consider them to be good when the results coincide with their own desires or predictions but who consider them bad in the opposite case.

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YSK PROCEDURAL RULING FOR DEPUTY CANDIDACY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Sep 83 p 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--Thursday is the last day for national deputy candidates from the political parties participating in the 6 November elections to resign. The Supreme Electoral Council [YSK] will officially notify the political parties regarding those who withdraw from candidacy, and the parties will have one day in which to report replacements for the withdrawals. Political parties will be free to "place the new candidate in the position vacated on the list by the one withdrawing or shift the list upward without loss of positions earned in the order of the list and add the new one at the bottom."

As many as 10 resignation applications have been received to date by the YSK from MDP [Nationalist Democracy Party], ANAP [Motherland Party] and HP [Populist Party] candidates for national deputy. Announced resignations from the MDP are Consultative Assembly member Abdurrahman Girmen, in fifth position from the Adana first electoral district, and Faruk Sukan, in third position from the Konya second electoral district. The HP's Erol Temel Kuran, fourth position from Mugla, and Ilhami Yilmaz, fifth position in the Izmir second electoral district, have also forwarded their resignations to the YSK. From ANAP, Hasan Basri Albayrak, in fourth position from Rize, announced his withdrawal. The political parties which will participate in the elections are in the process of naming new candidates to replace those who have withdrawn. According to information obtained, they are also choosing candidates ahead of time in case of vetoes by the National Security Council.

Meanwhile, yesterday was the last day to register objections to the deputy candidate lists announced by the YSK. Objections will be received and decided upon within 2 days by the Provincial Electoral Councils.

Authorities report that decisions adopted by the Provincial Electoral Councils may be appealed to the YSK, also within 2 days. The YSK will have 3 days in which to examine and decide upon these appeals.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

RULES IN DEPUTY ELECTIONS FOR BELOW-BARRAGE CASES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Sep 83 p 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--Should any political party fail to exceed the barrier in a province, national deputies will reportedly be elected on the basis of the percentage of the vote they receive.

Ismet Yanikomeroglu, chairman of the Supreme Electoral Council, said in an interview with a CUMHURIYET reporter that the first thing that will be checked when the elections are over is whether the political parties exceed the 10-percent barrier throughout Turkey in general. "If three parties fail to exceed the provincial barrier, then the provisions of the final paragraph of article 34 of the Electoral Law will apply," said Yanikomeroglu. Article 34 provides that "in the event that none of the political parties participating in the elections exceeds the provincial barrier, the outcome of the national deputy seats will be determined by applying the number of votes received by the political parties to the leading one, two, three, and so on until the number of seats to be filled by that district is reached." If all of the political parties remain below the provincial barrier in a province which is to elect five national deputies and if two independent candidates have not won election in that province, the remaining three national deputies will be determined under the provisions of article 34.

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DESTRUCTIVE WESTERN INFLUENCES ON YOUTHS ABROAD

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 13 Sep 83 pp 1, 9

[Article by Aydin Keles: "Identity"]

[Text] (West Germany)--Turkish youth in Europe is in crisis. Young people on the verge of total alienation from Islam have forgotten their morals and mores and become obsessed by sensual pleasures.

Youth, uninformed of what they are and why they were created, have become infatuated with the European hippy set, which has never heard of human kindness, and flout all the rules of human kindness.

They kill time at the night spots all night long and spend their days wandering about idly not knowing what to do. The Turkish youths of our day, hankering after the Western lifestyle, have been thrown into total crisis lately under the impact of unemployment.

Imitation of the Western lifestyle is tearing the youths away from their own identities. They take the hippies as their role models, falling into bad habits in the streets, gambling houses and various night spots.

However, the exertions of the Zionists account for a large share of the progressive moral decay. The promise of fun planned by the Zionists ensures a steady youthful flow to the night clubs, discotheques and other such places, where young people have no choice but to do disgraceful things.

Spiritually deprived youths are more vulnerable to bad habits such as gambling, drinking and shooting heroin.

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